ANDREWS v. SCOTTON. 659

Chancellor; but when ratified, it was his duty to pay the purchase
money, or shew good cause to the contrary. Neither of which
has he done in the present case; for neither the allegation of the
trustee's inability to comply with the terms of the sale, nor that
the property, being in the possession of a third person, the trustee
was unable to deliver him possession, is supported by a shadow
of proof.

Had the Chancellor, therefore, under the circumstances of this
case, a right to adopt the proceeding to which he resorted to com-
pel the payment of the purchase money ? We think he had. The
order of the Chancellor was, that Samuel Anderson, the purchaser,
should pay the money to the trustee, or bring the same into court
on a particular day, or shew good cause to the contrary. Under
the terms of this order, it is not perceived why Anderson could
not have made as full a defence, and have availed himself of all
the objections, which could have been relied upon, in case an ori-
ginal bill had been filed against him to enforce the same object.
Upon application to the Chancellor, setting forth that testimony
would be essential to his defence, on the hearing of the order, the
Chancellor would have passed an order to enable him to obtain it,
upon the return of which a full hearing of the merits of the case
might have been had; and if equity and justice required it, he
would and ought to have been discharged from his purchase.
That the Court of Chancery in England has the power of com-
pelling a purchaser to pay his purchase money after the confirma-
tion of the sale, by an order for that purpose, is not to be doubted.
Lansdowne v. Elderton, 14 Ves. 512; Newland Ch. Pr. 336. In
Brasher's Exrs. v. Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 506-7, it appears,
that by the practice of the Court of Chancery, in New York, a
purchaser may be compelled to complete his purchase; and Chan-
cellor Kent is reported to have said, 'I have no doubt the court
may, in its discretion, do it in every case, where the previous con-
ditions of the sale, have not given the purchaser an alternative.'

In this case it is quite apparent that procrastination and
delay are the objects of the purchaser, as he has taken every
measure in his power to prevent the ratification of the sale; and
after the sale was ratified, on appeal to this court, has still refused
to pay the purchase money, and has driven the trustee to resort to
the compulsory power of the Court of Chancery to coerce pay-
ment. Under these circumstances, we think it a fit case for the
exercise of such a power by that court; although it is not intended