ANDREWS v. SCOTTON. 637

or power of his own, he is merely the medium or conduit through
which the will of the contracting party is expressed. The master
or trustee is the mere attorney of the court, acting under a spe-
cially delegated authority, (a) And, in no case, is a master or
trustee authorized to do more than to accept an offer or proposal
to contract, which is of no sort of validity unless it be accepted,
ratified and confirmed by the court. It is the court itself, for the
benefit of all interested, therefore, who is the vendor in such cases*

But it may be said, if the court be the vendor in sales made by
its trustee, would it not follow, for the same reasons, that a court
of common law must be considered as the vendor in sales made
under its writ of fieri facias by the sheriff ? The cases are essen-
tially different. The writ of fieri facias is a general authority or
command to the sheriff to make so much money by sale from the
personal estate of the defendant. By this writ the executive officer
of the court is commissioned to seize the whole, any part, or so
much of the defendant's personal estate as may be necessary to
raise the specified sum of money. No particular articles of pro-
perty are ever designated. By statute, (b) this power, given by
the common law writ over personal estate, has been extended over
real estate. And the same writ, and nearly the same principles of
law, now apply to both species of property.

The real or personal estate with which the Court of Chancery
deals is, however, always in one form or other distinctly specified
in the proceedings; and the sale is made only because the court
is asked to have it made to accomplish the objects of the suit. In
the proceedings at common law, from the commencement to the
fieri facias, no property is designated. At common law, the terms
and manner of sale are regulated by law; in chancery, they are
regulated by the court. At common law if the sheriff, in seizing
the property and making the sale, conforms to the established regu-
lations applicable to all cases, (and he can sell in no other manner,)
the sale is final and valid as soon as it is made. But in chancery
the sale is, in no case, binding and conclusive, until it has been
expressly approved and ratified by the court. If it be made in a
manner wholly different from that prescribed by the court, it may
yet be sanctioned; or, if it be made in all respects conformable to
directions, it may still be rejected. And hence, it is obvious, that

(a) 1785, ch. 72, s. T; April, 1787, ch. SO, s. 5.—(b) 5 Geo. 2, c. 7.

81 v.2