ADDISON v. BOWIE. 625

posed of his property among them. He carefully describes the
several parcels of property, and the various advantages between
which they were to make their election; but in speaking of that
property and those advantages there is not the slightest reference
to the previously accumulated profits of their specific legacy of
negroes then in his hands. No property has been given in lieu
of those profits, or as a compensation for them; nor has any thing
been placed before these parties in competition with those profits.
And, therefore, it cannot be inferred that this claim for the profits
of those negroes, which had been then received, and were then in
hand, were intended to be embraced within the scope of that
election which the testator William expected his children to make;
for in relation to this doctrine of election, it certainly cannot be
so applied as to spell or guess a man out of his property. (l)

In equity, where a debtor bequeaths to his creditor a legacy
equal to or exceeding the amount of his debt, it may be presumed,
in the absence of a contrary intention, that the legacy was meant
as a satisfaction for the debt. The rule has not, however met with
general approbation, and does not apply where the debt did not
exist when the will was made, or where it was upon a negotiable
security, which might be then in the hands of a stranger; or
where the debt was due upon a current account, the amount of
which was unknown to the testator, (m) Here the testator might
well know that he was accountable to his children for the profits
of the legacy of negroes which had been given to them by their
grandfather; but there is no reason whatever to believe that he
then knew the amount; or from any expression in his will, that
he meant any bequest he made them should be considered as a
satisfaction of a debt. On the contrary, he expressly refers to the
will of the testator Baruck, and then distinctly indicates how far
what he gave should control or modify any right they might de-
duce from the will of their grandfather, without the most distant
allusion to any claim they had upon him, because of his having

(I) Forrester v. Cotton, 1 Eden, 532; Blake v. Bunbury, 1 Ves. jun. 524; Green
v. Green, 19 Ves. 667; S. C. 2 Meriv. 93; Tibbits v. Tibbits, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep.
148; Hall v. Hall, 1 Bland, 130.—(m) Rawlins v. Powel, 1 P. Will. 298; Jefls v.
Wood, 2 P. Will. 130; Thomas v. Bennet, 2 P. Will. 348; Fowler v. Fowler, 8 P.
Will. 853; Mathews v. Mathews, 2 Ves. 636; Richardson v. Greese, 8 Atk. 65;
Hinchcliffe v. Hinchcliffe, 3 Ves. 529; Carr v. Eastbrooke, 3 Ves. 561; Wathen v.
Smith, 4 Mad. 325; Partridge v. Partridge, 2 H. & J. 63; Edelen v. Dent, 2 G. & J.
185.