602 BROWN v. WALLACE.

of Chancery will put the plaintiff to his election, and compel him
to abandon the one suit or the other, (q)

These rules can only apply where the parties and the subject
are the same in both suits; but if there be any essential diffe-
rences between the two, either as to parties, or subject of contro-
versy, as in the cases under consideration, other reasons and prin-
ciples apply.

It has been said, that where an injunction had been refused by
the Chancellor, it could not be granted by a county court upon the
same case; or the reverse. This opinion seems to be sufficiently
well founded, if referred to a case in which the first bill is actually
depending at the time when the second application is made to the
co-ordinate court; or where, on hearing of the parties, or by de-
fault, the one court has refused or dissolved the injunction upon
the same case, in which an injunction is asked for in the other
court. Because, if all that had been done in the one court, was to
go for nothing in the other, a party might in every instance, as a
matter of course, avail himself of all the delay to be had in the
one court, and then take advantage of the identical same means of
procrastination in the other court, after a solemn judgment had
been pronounced there upon his case, without resorting to the
regular course of setting that judgment right, (r)

But an injunction is, in its effects and consequences, in many
respects, analogous to a prohibition. The object of an injunction
is to protect the citizen from harm, by acting upon the person
complained of. The same object is, in many instances, intended
to be accomplished by a prohibition, which acts immediately upon
the inferior tribunal; (5) a party may apply to each one of the
superior courts, in succession for a prohibition; and his ex parte
application having been refused by one, is of itself, no ground for
its being rejected by any other of them, (t) I therefore do not see
why, upon the same principles, a citizen might not be allowed to
take his chance, by a first ex parte application of obtaining an
injunction from each one of the courts having jurisdiction of his
case, in like manner as he is allowed to apply to each one for a pro-
hibition, without prejudice from having been refused by another of
them; particularly as the statute (u) does not require an injunction

(q) 1 Newl. Pra. Cha. 246.—(r) Reynolds v. Pitt, 19 Ves. 138.—(s) Eden Inj.
3.—(t) Smart v. Wolff, 3 T. R. 340; Forum Rom. 55.—(u) 4 Ann, C. 16, s. 22;
Kilty Rep. 247.