600 BROWN v. WALLACE.

The operation of this general rule is, in many respects, mutually
beneficial; for, as on the one hand, the court, by selling only the
title of the parties to the suit, and giving no warranty, involves
itself in no expensive, dilatory, and troublesome inquiries into the
validity of the title; so on the other hand, the purchaser is not
answerable for any irregularity of the court, nor for any disposition
•which it may make of the purchase money; he has a right to pre-
sume that the court has acted correctly in decreeing a sale. But
* as the court offers, and he takes no more than the title of the par-
ties to the suit, it is his duty to see that all who have an interest
in the property, and whose right ought to be bound by the decree,
have been made parties to the suit for that purpose, and have been
concluded by the decree under which he buys. And it is also
necessary, for the same reason, that the purchaser should ascertain
for himself whether or not the title of those parties may not be
impeached or superseded by some other and paramount title. For
he has no right to call upon the court to protect him from a title
not in issue in the case, and no way affected by the decree, (o)

Here I might stop and pronounce a final decree, that these two
bills be dismissed. But it has been urged that the Harford County
Court, although clothed with power, in all respects equal and con-
current with this court, had, in effect, no jurisdiction of this mat-
ter; because it was merely a branch of a suit then depending here;
and because the prosecution of these suits in that court thwarted
and was incompatible with the regular progress of the suit here
embracing the same subject.

It is obviously necessary for the public good, that the several
courts of justice of our system, should never allow themselves to
be brought in collision with each other. And, in general, they
are so well ordered as to all matters of common law, that they
cannot cross each other in any way whatever. Unfortunately,
however, the sphere of each one having concurrent equity juris-
diction has not been so well described as to prevent occasional
interferences, even where there exists the most decided intention
in each to confine itself strictly within its own orbit.

Soon after I came here I was made sensible of the necessity of
peat care and vigilance in order to steer clear of any collision

(o) Giffard v. Hort, 1 Scho. & Lefr. 386; Bennett v. Hamill, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 566;
Lloyd v. Johnes, 9 Ves. 65; Curtis v. Price, 12 Ves. 105,