598 BROWN v. WALLACE.

which the court was then dealing; they could not, thus uninvited,
thrust their own individual interests into a cause which was under
the direction of the court for the benefit of others as well as them-
selves. Therefore, in this view of the subject, the instrument of
the 29th of April, 1812, must be deemed entirely foreign from the
matter under consideration, (i)

If, on the other hand, Brown takes his stand as a purchaser from
the court, then, on recurring to the decree and trustee's report, it
will be seen that the decree covers the whole subject, and that the
trustee has confined himself strictly within the limits of the decree.
The bill had stated that two of the heirs of the late William Mit-
chell were minors, and they had answered as such; the trustee
had again incidentally reminded the Chancellor that one of them at
least was then a minor, in that part of his report in which he speaks
of their desire to have all the land sold. After this, it seems
strange to object that the Chancellor had ratified the sale under a
mistaken impression that all those heirs were of full age; on the
contrary, it is manifest that, from beginning to end, the Chancellor
was perfectly aware that he was dealing with the property of in-
fants. There could have been no mistake in this particular. It is
said that the instrument of the 29th of April, 1812, induced the
court to sanction the sale of the whole, which it otherwise would
not have done. But the court had previously decreed the sale of
the whole, or 'such part of the property in the proceedings men-
tioned as may be sufficient to pay the sums due from William Mit-
chell to the heirs of James Mitchell,' excepting Cooley's Fishery;
and no more having been sold than was thus authorized by the
decree, the ratification of the sale certainly could not be objected
to on that account. It has long been the course of the court to
ratify sales at once, with the consent of all concerned; and the
instrument of the 29th of April, 1812, in reference to that prac-
tice, merely indicated that there would be no opposition to a rati-
fication from those parties. But it is the habit of this court, for
convenience, to carry to market property which, in a subsequent
part of the cause, perhaps, it would have been unnecessary to sell;
looking at its own powers of setting right the interests of all parties
as among each other. The court often directs real estate to be sold
before it can know the real situation of the personal estate, (j)

(i) Weems v. Brewer, 2 H. & G. 307.—(j) Holme v. Stanley, 8 Ves. 1; Lbyd
v. Johnes, 9 Ves. 65; Hammond v. Hammond, ante 359.