594 BROWN v. WALLACE.

brought in; and some other proceedings were had; any particu-
lar account of which is, however, deemed unnecessary. Upon all
which, these several cases were together brought before the court.
5th July, 1830.—BLAND, Chancellor.—The parties having
agreed, that these two cases should be heard together and con-
solidated; and there being a convenience in having them so asso-
ciated; and as it may prevent confusion, and save repetition, I
shall therefore treat them as one suit. And that no equity, nor any
real ground of relief may be lost to this purchaser, I shall consider
all that is alleged in these several bills as if it had been regularly
introduced into the suit originally instituted in this court, by a pe-
tition in which every thing stated in those bills had been fully set
forth. And I shall then consider whether these bills, filed in a
court of concurrent jurisdiction, ought not to be dismissed, even
supposing, that they had presented a fit subject for equitable relief,
because of their being incompatible with the proceedings in this
court.

The first position assumed by this purchaser is, that he did not
obtain possession until several months after the day of sale; and,
therefore, that so much of the judgment against him as gives inte-
rest from that time is against equity, and ought not to be allowed.

It is a general rule as to sales under decrees of this court, that
the purchaser always pays interest, according to the terms of the
decree, from the day of sale, whether he gets possession or not.
His getting possession is, in no case, allowed to be a condition
precedent to the payment of either principal or interest of the pur-
chase money. The purchaser is presumed to regulate his bidding
with a view to the known powers and rules of the court as to de-
livering possession. There is, therefore, nothing in this objection,
even supposing this purchaser himself to have been in no default;
and, by promptly giving his bond, to have so clothed himself with
an equity to demand a delivery of possession immediately after the
sale had been finally ratified. But looking to his evasion or negli-
gence, this objection comes with an ill grace from him. (c)

The next position assumed by this purchaser is, that because
the heirs of the late William Mitchell have, since he bought, sold
a part of the same land he purchased to Carvel and Charles Cooley,
by a deed dated on the 14th of September, 1815, that therefore he
should not be compelled to pay the purchase money.

(c) Tyson v. Hollingworth, ante 334, note.