HELMS v. FRANCISCUS. 581
this treaty between the parties was fair and honest; and whatever
might have been the sufferings of Lewis Helms during his impri-
sonment for debt in the j all of Baltimore county, or however that
suffering might have been brought upon him, there is not the
slightest proof, that he was, as has been alleged, under any duress,
apprehension of harm, or mistake, as to the nature and object of
the agreement of the 29th of August, 1823, at the time it was
signed by him. That instrument, on his part, was his uncon-
strained voluntary act, done with a full knowledge of all the facts,
and of all his legal rights. By which writing he says, that he
'doth bind himself to renounce all the claim he has against his
wife A. G. M. Helms, as well as the claim he might have against
the estate of her deceased brother Carsten Newhaus.' Now the
only sound and sensible construction, that can be given to this
agreement, compatibly with the full existence of the marriage con-
tract, which the parties themselves cannot dissolve, is, that the
husband has thereby consented, that his wife's whole fortune shall
be settled upon her, to the use of herself, exclusively of her hus-
band as fully as may be, in all respects whatever. It is in this
light, that I view this agreement. I take it as an explicit consent
given by him, that his wife's whole fortune may be settled upon
her, and I shall decree accordingly.
But the plaintiff Anna had one son, an illegitimate child, born
before her marriage with Lewis Helms. Can he be allowed to
benefit by the proposed settlement ? This is the next point to be
considered.
It is a general rule, that in making provision for the wife, the
court extends it to the children of the marriage; and, in many
cases, it is extended to the children of the wife by that or any
other marriage. And although the wife may, at any time after her
share has been ascertained, (p) come into court and relinquish her
right, founded on what is called 'the wife's equity,' yet subject to
her release, her children acquire a vested interest in the provision,
directed to be made, from the date of the order; so that if she
dies after that period, without releasing it to her husband, they
may, notwithstanding, come in and have the settlement perfected
for their benefit, (q) In a settlement directed to be made, upon a
(p) Jernegan v. Baxter, 6 Mad. 32.—(q) Murray v. Elibank, 10 Ves. 90; S. C.
18 Ves. 5; Lloyd v. Williams, 1 Mad. Rep. 449; Fenner v. Taylor, 6 Cond. Cha.
Rep. 453.
74 v.2
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