HELMS v. FRANCISCUS. 579

husband, and her having been deluded into a marriage for the sole
purpose of enabling him to get hold of her property. But if, as
has been said, this court has the power to go so far as even to de-
clare the contract of marriage itself to be null and void, on the
ground of its having been procured by terror, abduction, and
fraud; (k) it would not be consistent with itself, and faithful to its
best principles, if it were not to allow itself, under such circum-
stances as are here presented, to deal out to the wife a liberal and
saving measure of justice; and, as the only means of preventing
the deceiver from profiting by his delusion, to have the whole of
her fortune settled upon her exclusively.

Let it, however, be supposed that Lewis Helms, in contracting
marriage with his present wife, was actuated by no improper or
unworthy motives; or that, even if he was, they cannot be allowed
to form any sufficient reason for stripping him of the whole of this
legacy, and that it is impossible the court should undertake, of
itself, to give the whole to her; because it cannot assume or admit
the position, that a married woman is entitled to the whole of her
separate property to her separate use, in direct opposition to the
clearest principles of the marriage contract. Yet the husband, at
least, is in a condition to bind himself by his own voluntary con-
sent; and, therefore, although the court itself cannot divest him
wholly of his marital rights, yet he himself may freely release
them; and if he does do so, such relinquishment may be received,
ratified, and cast into the shape of a settlement, by the court, for
the benefit of the wife and her children.

Where it appeared that the wife was entitled to a large legacy;
that she had been clandestinely married; that the husband, after
the marriage, had made a settlement equal to the whole amount
upon her, and that in consideration thereof, the trustees had paid
the legacy to the husband; it was held that the settlement of the
whole, by the agreement and consent of the husband, was binding
and good even against his creditors. (1) And where the husband
had given a note to his wife, that if he should treat her ill, she
should have her share of her mother's estate to her own use. It
was conceded that such a consent of the husband would have been
sufficient as to the amount; and that the whole might have been
settled upon the wife, (m) And where property had been be-

(k) Ferlat v. Gojon, 1 Hopk. Rep. 478.—(I) Moor v. Rycault, Prec. Cha. 22;
Wheeler v. Caryl, Amb. 121.—(m) Nicholls v. Danvers, 2 Vern. 671; Rodney v.
Chambers, 2 East. 283.