564 HELMS v. FRANCISCUS.

or her separate property for the purpose of paying his debts or of
otherwise forwarding his views; or she becomes his surety, as
she may in respect to her separate property; a court of equity
will order her to be re-imbursed out of her husband's property if
any shall remain after his creditors have been satisfied, (q)

These and other instances which might be cited clearly shew,
that a wife, during coverture, is not altogether so destitute of a
capacity to contract respecting her property as is indicated by the
general terms of the rule of the common law; but, that a husband
and wife may, in particular situations, treat together effectually, if
they treat upon fair and reasonable terms, (r)

It is now universally admitted, that a husband and wife are
utterly incompetent, of themselves, by any agreement of their
own, to effect even a partial dissolution of the marriage contract;
but they are allowed to agree to live apart; and as auxiliary to
that agreement, if the husband stipulate, throng the instrumen-
tality of a third person, to allow and pay to his wife a separate
maintenance, such a stipulation is legal; and may be enforced
against the husband, either in a court of law, or of equity; al-
though it has originated out of and relates to that unauthorized
state of separation in which the husband and wife have endea-
voured to place themselves. A separate maintenance of this kind
and pin-money are alike in this respect, that they are founded on
a special contract, and only payable during the marriage. Pin-
money is given gratuitously for her personal and private expen-
diture; it is an allowance always payable during co-habitation;
whereas a separate maintenance is that provision which a husband
contracts to pay to his wife where they have agreed to live apart
and is payable only during the period of separation; and in this
respect differs from pin-money. The examination of a few of
the decisions in relation to a separate maintenance of this descrip-
tion will be sufficient to shew what is considered to be its general
character in the courts of common law as well as in equity, (s)

(q) Huntington v. Huntington, 2 Vern. 437; Pocock v. Lee, 2 Vern. 604; Tale
v. Austin, 1 P. Will. 264; Bagot v. Oughton, 1 P. Will. 347; Quarles v. Lacey, 4
Mun. 258; Gosden v. Tucker, 6 Mun. 1.—(r) Hobbs v. Hull, 1 Cox, 445; Arun-
dell v. Phipps, 10 Ves. 140.—(s) Raynes v. Lewes, Nelson, 88; Whorewood v.
Whorewood, 1 Cha. Ca. 250; Head v. Head, 3 Atk. 295; S. C. 3 Atk. 547; Guth
v. Guth, 3 Bro. C. C. 614; Legard v. Johnson, 3 Ves. 352; St. John v. St. John, 11
Ves. 526; Worrall v. Jacob, 3 Meriv. 256; Westmeath v. Westmeath, 4 Cond. Cha.
Rep. 56; Rodney v. Chambers, 2 East 283; Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. &
J. 485.