534 WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON,

to be administered under a creditor's suit, they would clearly sug-
gest the propriety of allowing each creditor to come ia at onee,
^according to the terms of his contract, for the whole amount of his
claim then due; and of calling on him when so satisfied, to assign
Ms securities to the suing creditors, to the heir, or devisee, or t©
the exg£utor or administrator, or to suffer them to take his place for
so much as he had been satisfied for their own benefit or for that of
the legatees or next of kin of the deceased.

But the principles of this court are essentially different. In
bankruptcy, the creditor himself makes choice of the security, from
which he will obtain satisfaction, and the court, so far from lessen-
ing the obligation of any of his securities, or driving him from any
one of them, will assist him in enforcing his contract to the extent
of its jurisdiction, so as to insure to him one complete satisfaction;
but here, the court officiously interferes, and throws upon the cre-
ditor the burthen of shewing whether the deceased was principal
or surety, or co-surety; and then, unless he also proves, that the
co-surety or principal debtor, is insolvent, directly contrary to the
principles which prevail in bankruptcy, pushes the creditor par-
tially or entirely away from that portion of his security by which
the deceased's estate might have been made liable, (a)

The doctrines of bankruptcy sustains the obligations of the cre-
ditor's contract in all its bearings; the principles of this court
strike off a large proportion of its force on the very eve of fruition,
and at the moment when the means of a full or partial satisfaction
are shown to be immediately at hand. It is evident, therefore,
that nothing can be found to sustain these principles of this court
in any of the rules applicable to cases of bankruptcy.

It might perhaps, have been urged, that the peculiar circum-
stances under which the rights of a creditor, and the liabilities of
his debtor are presented in a ereditor's suit, calling for the admi-
nistration of the real assets of such deceased debtor, render it
necessary to depart from those rules so clearly applicable in a
different state of things, and require the adoption of these princi-
ples of this court, in order to do equal justice to all whose interests
have been brought into conflict by the death of the debtor.

It is certain, however, that the mere act of God, as the death of
the debtor, does not change the rights of the creditor; nor can
they be affected by any change, from that cause, in the mental

(a) Ex parte Kendall, 17 Ves. 519.