528 WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON.

This third position, taken in support of the principles of this
court, rests upon the general doctrine in relation to principal debtor
and surety. It is alleged, that the creditor must be excluded from
any participation in the deceased's estate; because he had it in
his power to recover his whole claim, or a due proportion of it,
from the principal debtor, or the other sureties; or because he is
chargeable with some injurious negligence as regards the deceased
debtor, whose estate the court is then about to distribute. And
assuming these allegations to be true, until the contrary is shewn,
the court calls upon the creditor to explain the transaction, and
to shew which of the obligors is the principal, and which the
surety.

In the common case of a money bond, there is no distinction
upon the face of it, between the principal and surety; nor is it
necessary to be shewn in any suit upon such a bond, who is prin-
cipal and who is surety; except for the purpose of administering
the equities that arise between the principal and sureties. Such
an instrument shews only, that the creditor has parted with his pro-
perty, or lent his money on a security, by which two persons are
jointly and severally bound to him. The contract is legal and fair;
and therefore, as to him, they are both principal debtors; though
with respect to each other, they may stand in the relation of prin-
cipal and surety. Of the interests or motives between them, the
creditor has, or need have no knowledge. All he looked to was a
security, by which two persons were equally and jointly bound to
him; and that his security had an admitted legal obligatory force
fully to that extent. And if the bond were joint only, still as
against other creditors even, and in the administration of assets,
it would be allowed to have the effect of a several bond, (f)
Yet, according to these principles of this court, the creditor must
not only know which of the obligors is the principal debtor, and
which the surety, but may have the burthen cast upon him of
developing by proof, the latent circumstances of the contract itself;
and of shewing that the other obligors, who were bound with the
deceased, are insolvent. Thus assuming, as established matters
of fact, until the contrary is shewn, that the deceased was a surety
only; that the principal debtor, and all the other obligors, are well
able to pay on demand; and that the creditor, knowing all this, is
making an unjust attempt to oppress the representatives of the

{/) Burn v. Burn, 3 Ves. 574; Just. Inst, by Coop. 613.