524 WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON.

otherwise, it would be impossible, or improper, or unsafe, accord-
ing to the reasons of the principles of the court to decide upon the
relative equities of the deceased debtor whose representatives were
then before the court and his co-obligors; without compromiting
the interests of some, or doing gross injustice to the creditor.

Under our system of partible inheritances the difficulties which
beset a creditor's bill, by which it is necessary to bring before the
court a large family of heirs and devisees of a deceased debtor,
together with his executors or administrators, have been found to
be so very great, that it has been attempted to remedy the evil by
requiring the heir at common law alone to be served with process,
and allowing all the others to be called in, by a general publica-
tion, and to appear or not as they might think proper, (z) There
is, however, no instance to be found in the English books, nor
among the records of this court, of a creditor's suit, in which it
was ever proposed to make a co-obligor of the deceased debtor a
party to the suit. But if, in addition to the family of representa-
tives of the deceased debtor himself, the families of his co-obligors,
were, in like manner, allowed, or required to be brought before the
court by each of the creditors to whom they were bound, the
parties would be innumerable, abatements would be continual,
the suit would be interminable, and justice suspended and with-
held forever.

This general rule, that all persons interested must be made par-
ties, is, however, made to yield where necessary in the instance
either of plaintiffs or defendants; since the rigid enforcement of it
would lead to perpetual abatements, and in many cases amount to
an absolute denial of justice. In all such cases the rights of the
omitted parties are held to be established or bound by the decree;
and although, in England, an inconvenience arises, as to the omit-
ted parties, where a specific performance, or a conveyance may be
required of all; (a) yet even that difficulty has been, in a great
measure, removed by our act of assembly which declares, that in
all cases where a decree shall be made for a conveyance, release,
or acquittance, and the party shall neglect or refuse to comply
therewith, such decree shall stand, be considered, taken, and have
the effect of the conveyance, release, or acquittance so ordered. (5)

Hence, as it would be difficult or impracticable, and therefore is

(z) 1797, ch. 114; Kilty v. Brown, ante 222,—(a) London v. Richmond, 2 Vern.
422; Meux v. Maltby, 2 Swan. 284; Newton v. Egmont, 6 Cond. Cha. Rep. 346.—
(6) 1785, ch. 72, s. 13; 1826, ch. 159.