«J*
WATKINS v. WORTHINGTON, §21

and without hindrance or delay to his creditors, do what it can to
save his estate for his benefit, (o) It is, however, certain, that the
change of condition of a person who has entered into an agree-
ment by becoming a lunatic, or the death of a debtor and the de-
scent of his estate, which has been incumbered, or is chargeable
with the payment of his debts, will not alter the rights of the par-
ties, which will be the same as before; provided they can come at
the remedy, (p)

Such was the law of Maryland when, by a British statute, passed
the year 1732, and soon after adopted here, lands in this state were
made liable to be taken in execution, and sold for the satisfaction of
all debts; (q) which, however, did not prevent the parol from de-
murring, (r) After which, it was, by an act of assembly, declared
that any real estate held by an infant, or person 'non compos mentis,
might be sold for the satisfaction of the money with which it was
chargeable, upon a bill filed in, and by a decree of the Court of
Chancery, with the consent of the guardian of the infant, as therein
prescribed, (s) And where an action at common law has been
brought, in which the title to real estate is involved, which action
has abated by the death of either the plaintiff or the defendant,
and such title has descended, or been devised to an infant, it is
declared that the action shall not be tried during the minority of
such infant, unless his guardian, or next friend, shall satisfy the
court that it will be for his benefit to have it tried, (t) By another
legislative provision, it is made the duty of heirs and devisees of
full age, or upon their arrival at the age of twenty-one, in case of
a deficiency of personal assets, to pay the debts of their ancestor
or devisor out of the real assets, in the same order and manner in
which they would have been paid out of the personalty, (u)

But in equity all the real estate of a deceased debtor, whose
personal property is not sufficient to pay his debts, is, by positive
legislative enactment, made absolutely liable to be immediately
sold for that purpose, without delay, notwithstanding its having
descended, or been devised, to an infant, or person non compos
mentis, and that, too, without requiring, as formerly, a conveyance

(o) Ex parte Philips, 19 Ves. 123; Ex parte Hall, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 74; Shelf.
Lun. 357.—(p) Steel v. Alan, 2 Bos. & Pul. 362; Pillop v. Sexton, 3 Bos. & Pul.
550; Sackvill v. Ayleworth, 1 Vern. 105; Owen v. Davies, 1 Ves. 82.—(q) 5 Geo.
2, ch. 7.—(r) Lechmere v. Brasier, 2 Jac. & Wal. 290.—(s) 1773, ch. 7; Pue v.
Dorsey, 1 Bland, 139, note.—(f) 1785, ch. 80, s. 2; James v. Boyd, 1 H. & G. 1.—
(u) 1785, ch. 80, s. 7.