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CORRIE'S CASE.
pacity then to make a will disposing of their real estates, (x) Yet,
as it has been held that such females cannot be deemed of full age
for any other purpose, or ia any other respect, (y) it would seem
necessarily to follow, that female orphans between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-one years, who have no testamentary guar-
dian, being a class of infants for whom a guardian cannot be ap-
pointed by the Orphans Court, (z) guardians can only be provided
for them by the Chancellor. It is admitted, on all hands, that the
father is the natural guardian of all his legitimate children until
they attain twenty-one years of age, or until the females attain that
age or marry. But it seems to be doubtful whether the guardian-
ship of a mother over her children continues longer than the age
of fourteen; (a) if not, then it would seem, according to a fair
construction of the before-mentioned legislative enactments, so far
as the courts of ordinary jurisdiction may be permitted to assume
any constructive power under them, (b) that a guardian may be
appointed by them during the residue of such infancy. But in
such case, and in all others, where the ordinary tribunals have no
power to make an appointment; as in case of the lunacy or in-
competency of a natural or testamentary guardian; (c) or where,
because of the limited jurisdiction of those tribunals, they are in-
competent to grant relief suited to the peculiar nature or exigency
of the case, the general jurisdiction and power of the Chancellor,
which has been in no way abolished or diminished, may be resorted
to and applied with effect, (d)
The proper education of youth has, every where, and at all
times, been held to be a matter of great and important interest to
the state. (e) In England there has always been a religion, or
church, by law established, which, by considering the clergy as
one of the three estates of the realm, has been interwoven with the
fundamental law and constitution of the nation. The regulation
of schools has, therefore, in England, to a certain extent, been
(9) 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 1, s g.—(y) Smith v. Williamson, 1 H. & J. 149 j Davis
v.Jacquin, 5 H. St J. 100; Bowers v. The State,? H. &J. 32; Crapster v. Griffith,
ante 7.—(z) 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 12; 1807, ch. 136, s. 4.—(a) Eyre v. Shafts-
bury, 2 P. Will. 116; Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. 158; ——— v. ———, 2 Ves. 374;
Villareal v. Mellish, 2 Swan, 536, note; The King v. Oakley, 10 East. 491; 2 Fonb.
287; Hay v. Conner, 2 H. & J. 347; Jarrett v. The State, 5 G. & J. 28.--(b) 1708,
ch. 101, sub ch, 15, s. 20.--(c) Beaufort v. Berty, 1 P. Will. 706; 1 Blac. Com., by
Chit 463, note 12; 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 4.—(d) Beaufort v. Berty, 1 P. Will. 705;
Roach v. Garvan, 1 Ves. 158,—(e) Beaufort v. Berty, 1 P. Will. 703; Vattel, b. 1,
ch. 11, s. 112.
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