500 CORRIE'S CASE.

marriage, or remains subject to be disposed of by her last will, or
otherwise, as regulated by the law of their domicil, as selected by
him, (m) and subject to the claims of his and her creditors ac-
cordingly, (n) As where the husband is allowed, by the law of
their domicil, to sue for and recover his wife's personal estate in
equity, without making any settlement upon her, on the ground of
what is here called 'the wife's equity,' the sum claimed and due in
her right, will accordingly be ordered to be paid to him without
his making any such settlement upon her. (o)

Upon the ground of this duty which the state owes to its citi-
zens, the general assembly of Maryland have, by sundry legisla-
tive enactments, provided, that where an infant, who has no na-
tural or testamentary guardian, may be entitled to real estate by
descent or devise, or to personal property by bequest, or in a course
of distribution, or may have acquired any property by gift or pur-
chase, the Orphans Court of the county where the land lies, oi in
which administration of the personal estate is granted, shall have
power to appoint a guardian to such infant until the age of twenty-
one years, if a male, and until the age of eighteen, if a female, or
marriage; and that such guardian shall be charged with the care,
maintenance and education of such infant, and with the manage-
ment of his or her estate, (p) Declaring, however, in connection
with those general provisions, that nothing therein contained should
be construed to affect the general superintending power exercised
by the Court of Chancery with respect to trust, (q)

Now, on recollecting what has been before said as to the juris-
diction of the Court of Chancery, as the representative of the state,
in its duty to infants as parens patria; and that by an English
statute, passed in the year 1660, and adopted here, fathers have
been authorized to appoint guardians to their legitimate infant
children, (r) it clearly appears, that the ordinary tribunals, whose
jurisdiction has been thus defined, cannot appoint a guardian to
any infant whose father or mother is alive; or who has a testamen-

(m) Lashley v. Hog, Robbins' Succession, 430.—(n) Feaubert v. Turst, Prec.
Cha. 207; The Goods of Maraver, 3 Eccle. Rep. 218.—(o) Minet v. Hyde, 2 Bro.
C. C. 663; Bourdillon v. Adair, 3 Bro. C. C. 237; Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. 321;
Sawer v. Shute, 1 Anstr. 63; Dues v. Smith, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 257.—(p) 1715,
ch. 39, s. 13 and 15; 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 12; 1807, ch. 136, s. 4; 1829, ch. 216,
s. 5; 1831, ch. 305, s. 5 and ch. 315, s. 8, 9 and 11.—(7) 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 12,
s. 16; 1831, ch. 315, s. 17.—(r) 12 Car. 2, c. 24; Kilty Rep. 238; 1798, ch. 101,
sub ch. 12; Villareal v. Mellish, 2 Swan. 536, note.