498 CORRIE'S CASE.

to do so, in order to hold the property of the intestate within reach,
as a means of satisfying his English creditors and next of kin; or
if there were no creditors, or next of kin, as a means of securing
it for the benefit of the state to whom, in such case, it properly
belonged, (f)

But latterly, in England as well as in this country, a more en-
larged and just view has been taken of this matter; and it has
been held, that as the state must have a right to regulate that
which it protects, and is bound in duty to see its own citizens
satisfied before it suffers the property of their debtor to be with-
drawn from its jurisdiction, no foreign administration shall be
recognized here. And that the administration of all deceased
persons' estates must be taken out here by a citizen of the United
States, (g) in order that there may be some person here responsi-
ble to our own citizen creditors, legatees, and distributees of the
deceased, to the full value of his effects found here; and also, that
after the debts have been paid, if there be no next of kin, that the
surplus be paid to the state, or to the public schools here, to whom,
in such cases, it properly belongs; or according to the law of the
deceased's last domicil. (h)

It having been universally admitted, not indeed as a binding
rule of international law, but as a matter of general comity among
civilized nations, that personal property follows the domicil of its
owner; and that the succession to it must be regulated, on his
death intestate, fay the law of that domicil; and as the administra-
tion of such property looks, in the first place, to the payment of
all the debts of the deceased, and then to a distribution among
those entitled to succeed to it, according to the law of the de-
ceased's domicil, it most commonly happens, that none but an
administration under that law can, with facility, if at all, embrace
both those objects. Consequently, the administration of the de-
ceased's domicil is, every where, regarded as the administration in

(f) Daniel u. Luker, Dyer, 305; Jauncey v. Sealey, 1 Vern. 397; Tourton v.
Flower, 3 P. Will. 370; Atkins v. Smith, 2 Atk. 63; Thorne v. Watkins, 2
Ves. 36.—(g) 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 4 and 5.—(h) Bempde v. Johnstone, 3 Ves.
198; Somerville v. Lord Somerville, 5 Ves. 750; In the Goods of Beggia, 2 Eccle.
Rep. 126; Holmes v. Remsen, 20 John. Rep. 265; Grame v. Harris, 1 Dall. 456;
McCullough v. Young, 1 Bin. 63; Desesbats v. Berquier, 1 Bin. 336, 349, note;
Anonymous, 1 Hayw. S55; Admr. of Butts v. Price, 1 Cam. & Norw. 68; Harri-
son v. Sterry, 5 Cran. 289; Smith v. The Union Bank of Georgetown; 5 Peters,
618; Glenn v. Smith, 2 G. 8c J. 403: Charlotte Hall School v. Greenwell, 4 G. & J.
408; Thomas v. Visitors of Frederick County School, 7 G. & J. 370.