492 CORRIE'S CASE.

its own citizens. Upon which obligation each member of the com-
munity, as a component part of the whole, has a clear and unde-
niable claim upon the state for its assistance, in all cases, where,
either because of the over-ruling circumstances in which he may
be placed, or because of his own peculiar imbecility, he is incapa-
ble of sustaining himself. Hence it is, that, according to all law,
a state is bound to take care of and protect its own infants, luna-
tics, and paupers, (g) And such has always been the practice,
and the admitted obligation and law of Maryland.

In England, many doubts and much contrariety of opinion have
been expressed as to the sources from which the Chancellor derives
the power he exercises in cases of infancy and lunacy. It is ad-
mitted, on all hands, that the state is under an obligation to put
forth its power for the protection of such persons in some way, the
only difference of opinion there, being as to the extent to which
that power, looking to the manner in which it has been delegated
to the Chancellor, shall be exercised by him for the benefit of those
who may be found in that imbecile condition, (h) The Chancel-
lor, or any court of common law may, by means of a habeas cor-
pus, relieve an infant or lunatic as well as an adult of sound mind
from any illegal restraint, or set him free, without making any pro-
vision whatever for him, under that form of proceeding. But the
general care which he has a right to claim, as a due from the state,
can only be obtained from the Chancellor upon the ground of that
parental authority with which he has been clothed as the represen-
tative of the state for the benefit of all such persons, (i)

Here it has always been admitted, apparently without any refe-
rence to the sources from which the Chancellor of England had
derived his authority, that the Chancellor of Maryland was invested
with all the powers in relation to infants and lunatics, with which
the Chancellor of England had been clothed; as founded on an
obvious necessity, that the law should place somewhere the care of
individuals who could not take care of themselves, particularly in
cases where it was clear, that some care should be thrown around
them. And consequently, the broad principle may be safely as-

(£) Eyrie e. Shaftsbury, 2 P. Will, 118, 123; Vattel, b. 1, ch. 2; Montesq.
Sp. Law, b. 23, ch. 29.—(A) Co. Litt. 89, a. note 16; 2 Fonb. 226; 1 Blac. Com.
302, 304, 460; De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 63.—(f) De Manneville
v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 58; Lyons v. Blenkin, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 115, and notes;
The King v. Hopkins, 7 East. 579; The Case of the Hottentot Venus, 13 East. 195;
Exparte. Skinner, 17 Com. Law Rep. 122.