*

48 TOWNSHEND v. DUNCAN.

ber, 1827. No other testimony was taken or returned with that
commission,

On the 24th of January, 1828, the infant defendants put in their
answer, by their guardian ad litem, in which they said, that they
knew nothing of the contents of the bill; nor could they admit
them; but prayed that they might be proved, and that their
interests might be protected.

21st February, 1828.—BLAND, Chancellor.—This case standing
ready for hearing, and having been submitted, the proceedings
were read and considered.

The law of a case arises out of the facts of which it is consti-
tuted, and it is the duty of the court to declare what that law is.
It is therefore not only unnecessary, but, in some cases it may
be deemed impertinent, in a suitor to set forth, and comment
upon what he conceives to be the law arising out of his case. To
do so, without stating all the facts, or upon an imperfect statement
of facts; as for example, to charge a defendant with fraud, with-
out stating any such facts, as in contemplation of law, constitute a
fraud, can form no foundation for relief or defence. It is sufficient
that each party should state the facts of his own case; and there-
fore, although it is not unusual for a plaintiff to state in his bill,
by way of anticipation, some of the allegations and pretences of
*. the defendant; it is not indispensably necessary, in any case, or
even proper in all cases, to set forth any matter in the bill, which
if brought out at all, should come from the defendant as consti-
tuting a part or the entire foundation of his defence. But, it is
essential that the plaintiff should distinctly state every fact neces-
sary to constitute such a case as gives him a right to claim relief
from the defendant at the time of filing his bill; and moreover, to
set forth those peculiar circumstances which justify him in passing
by the ordinary tribunals of the common law, and coming into a
Court of Equity to seek that relief. The plaintiff may state his
case in the alternative, or with a double aspect, so that it may be
considered in one way, or in another; provided, that in whatever
way it is presented, it falls properly within the cognizance of a
Court of Equity. Upon a case, so stated, the plaintiff may either
pray for special or for general relief; or he may make both special
and general prayers for relief. And where the nature of the case
is such, that the special prayer or designated relief cannot be
granted; then, under the general prayer, relief may be granted,
suitable to the peculiar nature of the case; as to which the court