MURDOCHS CASE. 473

The defendant answered the bill, and denied the right of the
plaintiff to the land on which the fence, or any part of it, had been

to stay, surcease, and forbear from molesting or disturbing the plaintiff, in the peace-
able possession and quiet enjoyment of one moiety and half-part of the said ferry
and ferry-house situate on the said land, called United Friendship, lying in Baltimore
county, and the appendages to the same belonging; and also injoining and pro-
hibiting him from preventing the plaintiff from receiving his half-part of the profits
of the said ferry, called Patapsco Upper Ferry, weekly and every week, according to
the agreement between the parties aforesaid, till the court should take further order
in the premises.'

11th May, 1796.—HANSON, Chancellor.—The Chancellor has examined this bill.
It appears to him, that an injunction granted on filing a bill, and before hearing of
the defendant, never does and never ought to go further than to prohibit the defen-
dant from doing something which appears, from the statement of the bill, to be against
equity and good conscience, and prejudicial to the rights of the complainant, for
instance, to stay waste or proceedings at law, Sec. &c. that is, to suspend the de-
fendant, &c. An injunction directing the defendant to put the complainant into
possession of a benefit, or what is stated to be his right, is never to be granted, as the
Chancellor conceives, until a final hearing of the whole merits of the cause, unless
in the case of a right established by record. The statement of the bill is imperfect;
but the Chancellor supposes, from the nature of" the application, that the conduct of
the ferry, and the possession thereof, is in the defendant. If so, the injunction
prayed is, in effect, to direct the defendant to settle weekly with the complainant,
and pay him one-half of the profits, which indeed are, and must be, uncertain; that
is to say, the injunction is to put the complainant into possession of a benefit. The
complainant does not pray that the defendant be prohibited from carrying on the
ferry, &c. &c. If the conduct of the ferry be in the hands of the complainant, he
needs the aid of this court as prayed. In short, it appears to the Chancellor that he
cannot, with propriety, grant the injunction on the bare statement of the complain-
ant and his vouchers, considered ex partc. Whether or not an injunction may be
granted or decreed, on the final hearing, is a question which may hereafter be de-
termined.

The next day the bill was, with some suggestions and references, again submitted
to the Chancellor for re-consideration.

12th May, 1796.—HANSON, Chancellor.—The Chancellor has again considered this
case. He finds that an injunction has been granted by Chancellor Rogers, in the case
of Dallam v. Onion. The principle on which it was there granted, must apply to
the present case; and although the Chancellor is satisfied that, in a case like the
present, an injunction was never granted in England, and he retains the opinion de-
livered yesterday, it is Ordered, that injunction issue as prayed by the bill. At the
same time he declares, that he shall most severely punish a violation of the injunc-
tion, in case the defendant shall fail to make it appear that he has no right to the
benefit he claims.

The defendant, by his answer filed on the 19th of September, 1796, admitted the
devise, the possession of the land, and the establishment of a ferry, the profits of
which were, for some time, divided weekly as slated; but denied that a public road
had been opened to it by them; and alleged, that the road to the ferry, then used,
ran through his land and was used by his permission, and not from any establishment
of it by law; that there never was any ancient road to the ferry, but that the ancient