428 JONES v. STOCKETT.

I seems to have been distinctly within the contemplation of the tes-
tator. For the trustees are expressly directed to retain the sole
possession of the property for the purpose of educating the infant;
and there is no provision for his maintenance, except, as an indis-
pensable means of educating him; that is, while he may be at
school, and not residing with his father. The distinctly expressed
intentions of the testator are that the infant be educated; that so
much of the yearly proceeds of the property as may be necessary
are to be applied for that purpose; and that all over and above
what may be necessary to attain that object shall be put out on in-
terest to the best advantage, and paid to him after his arrival at
age; or, in other words, that if, from any cause, he cannot be edu-
cated as desired, he shall have the money which might have been
spent in that way.

It is clear, that upon mere common law principles, and by means
of a writ of habeas corpus alone, the Chancellor, the judges, or
the courts of common law can do little more than relieve any one
from illegal restraint, (p) The Chancellor, however, not only has
the power, by habeas corpus, to discharge any one from illegal con-
finement, but he has had delegated to him, as representing the
state in its capacity of parens patriciae, the power to provide, accord-
ing to law, for the safety and proper treatment of infants who are
unable to take care of themselves, (q) It was only as to the ex-
tent of this large parental authority of the court, that I had enter-
tained some doubts, (r) My first impression was, when this case
was opened before me, that this court could not, for any purpose
however apparently laudable, deprive a father of the care and cus-
tody of his infant children; thrown upon him by the law, not for
his gratification, but on account of his duties to them, with refer-
ence to the public welfare, and place them against his will in the
hands of another, (s)

But, upon a more careful investigation, I find, that although it
is admitted to be always a delicate thing for the court to interfere
against the parental authority, yet that it will do so when it be-
comes necessary for the safety, protection, and obvious benefit of
the infant. The court founding its judgment in such cases, as in
those between husband and wife, upon an admission that the tie

(p) Lyons v. Blenkin, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 120; Ex parts Skinner, 17 Com. Law
Rep. 122.—(q) Wellesley v. Beaufort, 3 Cond. Cha. Rep. 10; 2 Fonb. 226.—(r) 2
Load. Jurist, 66.—(s) St. John v. St. John, 11 Ves. 531.