HAMM0ND v. HAMMOND. 377

the costs a part of that judgment debt upon which subsequent
interest is to be computed until paid, no interest has been allowed

but as the money is not deposited, the claims are to bear interest, which is discharged
with the interest paid by the purchaser.

This practice appears to the Chancellor unexceptionable. It as a principle of this
court, that the amount of a claim here liquidated shall bear interest from the time of
its liquidation. Is it not proper, then, that there be one day for the liquidation of
all the claims against one estate ? What day can be so proper as that from which
the purchasers are chargeable with interest ? Can it be conceived, that a tobacco
debt is never to be liquidated until the money is brought into court ? If that were
the case, it would be impossible to ascertain the dividends of an insolvent estate
until the money should be actually brought in. Would not great inconvenience be
the result ? Can it be conceived right, on any ground, that the value of the tobacco
debt, which must at last be discharged in money, be subject to fluctuation until the
time of actual payment ? Is it not consistent with the spirit of this court, that one
general rule should govern, so far as general rules can govern, all the cases of this
kind, as well as of every other ? And what general rule could be more just, with
respect to tobacco claims, than the rule adopted, viz. that the day of sale shall be the
day for adjusting the claims, the day to which interest shall be calculated, and on
which the whole claim shall be consolidated with principal; the day on which the
value of the tobacco, wheat, or other article, due from the deceased shall be inquired
into ? It is intimated that the commutation of money into tobacco is a fair specula-
tion, &c. Suppose, then, that tobacco, since the day of sale, had fallen in price,
would it appear just that the claim should be curtailed on that account, after it had
been once ascertained ?

On the whole, it appears to the Chancellor that the account No. 1, returned by the
auditor, and not excepted against by the creditors or heir, allows the aforesaid execu-
tors as much as they 6an in reason claim. It is, therefore, adjudged and Ordered,
that the said account be admitted, and that the exceptions of the said executors be
overruled,

After which, the case was again brought before the court for further directions as
to the claim of John A. Frazier.

28th December, 1793.—HANSON, Chancellor.—Ordered, that the Chancellor will,
on the first day of March next, decide on the claim of John A, Frazier against the
estate of Alexander Frazier; and that depositions, taken before any judge or justice,
on two days notice, shall be received as evidence on hearing of the said claim. The
objections against the said claim being made by James Pattison's executor, the par-
ties to the dispute are considered to be Jacob Pattison, the said executor, and the
said John A. Frazier.

Without taking any testimony under this order, the claim was afterwards brought
before the court upon the proceedings and proofs in the case.

13th August, 1790.—HANSON, Chancellor.—This is an account drawn up by the
claimant's solicitor, and not sworn to by the claimant, as unquestionably it ought to
have been, if it was expected to be passed. His death has now made it impossible
to have such an oath, and the solicitor relies on the testimony obtained on a commis-
sion between James Pattison and the said claimant, which issued for a purpose very
different from that of trying the justice of this claim. The Chancellor heretofore
delayed his decision, in order that the persons interested against the claim might
have an opportunity of obtaining proofs; but no evidence hath been since obtained