370 HAMMOND v. HAMMOND.

allowable, to direct interest to be earned down to the time of the
actual payment, or the bringing of the money into court, (u)

It has been declared by an act of assembly, that, in all actions
brought for the penalty of any bond or contract, the jury may,
under the direction of the court, upon the plea of payment or per-
formance, find what sum of money is really due to the plaintiff;
upon which judgment shall be entered for the penalty to be released
upon the payment of the sum so found due, and interest on the
same until paid and costs, (w) So that, under this act, the plain-
tiff may, as in an action of debt upon a judgment, recover further
interest, except on the costs, upon the aggregate amount of his
judgment, and have his execution thereon levied accordingly. As
for example, if the debt really due was $100, with $30 interest,
the jury would be directed to find a verdict for $130, upon which
judgment would be entered with interest on the same from the day
of signing the judgment until paid, (x) It had also become
usual, in the courts of common law, in actions of debt, assump-
sit, &c. where the defendant confessed judgment, to enter it for the
amount claimed in the declaration, with a memorandum at the foot
of the judgment, that it should be released on the payment of the
whole sum then due, with interest thereon from that day until paid,
and costs of suit, (y) After which it was enacted, that all judg-
ments by default, and in all cases where a verdict should be given,
the judgment thereon should carry interest in the same manner as
in cases of a confession of judgment, (z)

Equity, in this respect, follows the law; or, rather has always
pursued a similar course, and allows interest in all cases where,
under like circumstances, it might be recovered at law. (a) And
therefore, as a judgment here, as in England, always had the
effect of converting the interest then due into principal, so that, in
an action of debt, interest might be recovered upon the whole
amount; and as such subsequent interest may now be levied here
under a fieri facias. (6) So upon the whole amount awarded by an

(w) Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Ves. jun, 165; Millar v. Baker, 1 Bland, 148, note;
Long v. Gorsuch, 1 Bland, 361, note; Parker v. Mackall, ante 62; Woodward v,
Chapman, ante 68; Sloss v. McIlvane, ante 72; Craig v. Baker, ante 238.—(w)
1785, ch. 80, s. 13.—(x) 2 Harris' Ent. 192.—(y) 2 Harris' Ent. 87, 97.—(z) 1809,
ch. 158, s. 4; 1811, ch. 161, s. 5; Hawkins v. Jackson, 6 H. & J. 151.—(a) Parker
v. Hutehinson, 3 Ves. 133; Upton v. Ferrers, 5 Ves. 803; Dornford v. Dornford, 12
Ves. 120; Lowndes v, Collens, 17 Ves. 28.—(6) Gwinn v. Whitaker, 1 H. & J,
754.