352 HAMMOND v. HAMMOND.

These principles of law and equity operated very prejudicially
against creditors who had no other means of obtaining satisfaction
of their claim than from the real estate of their deceased debtor in
the hands of his infant heir or devisee; and therefore, it by
an act of assembly, declared, that a decree for a sale of the real
estate for the satisfaction of any claim against it might be obtained
by the consent of the guardian of the infant heir or devisee, (z)
Thus, in effect, giving to the answer of an infant, by his guardian,
in all creditors' suits, and suits by mortgagees, the force and opera-
tion of an adult defendant in so far as to authorize the immediate
sale of the realty without allowing the parol to demur, (a) By a
subsequent legislative enactment it was declared, that if any per-
son should die without leaving personal estate sufficient to discharge
the debts by him due, and should leave real estate, the Chancellor,
after summoning the minor heir or devisee, and his appearance by
guardian to be appointed for that purpose, and to answer and de-
fend for him; and on the justice of the claim of the creditor being
fully established, might order the real estate to be sold for the pay-
ment of the debts due by the deceased. (6) Thus virtually abol-
ishing the infant's privilege of having the parol to demur, and of
shewing cause when he attained his full age; and so placing it in
the power of the Court of Chancery, at once, to compel him to do
justice to the creditors of his ancestor or devisor, by divesting him
of the privilege of alleging his minority as a means of obstructing,
for a time, the regular course of justice.

It having been thus put upon infant defendants, in such cases,
to defend their interests immediately, and as effectually as they
can, by a mere guardian ad litem, who has been expressly autho-
rized to consent to an immediate sale of the real estate; the an-
swer of an infant by his guardian, in all such cases, must be taken
to be as conclusive against him as if he had answered as an adult,
(c) And as a creditor, who comes in under a decree, may have
his claim allowed upon affidavit, if it be not expressly denied and
contested; so a creditor, suing as an original plaintiff, may obtain
a decree on a similar authentication of his claim, unless it be ex-
pressly denied and put in issue by the answer of an adult or infant
defendant; otherwise a plaintiff creditor would be made to en-
counter greater difficulties than one who came in under the de-

(z) 1773, ch. 7.—(a) Prutzman v, Pitesell, 3 H. and J. 80; Pue v. Dorsey, 1
Bland, 139, note.—(b) 1785, ch. 72, s, 5; Birch v. Glover, 4 Mad. 376.—(c) Kent
v. Taneyhill, 6 G. and J. 3,