HAMMOND v. HAMMOND. 347

As to who may or must be made parties to a creditor's suit, the
general rule is, that all persons having an interest in the object
of the suit, ought to be made parties. But as this rule results
from a consideration of the advantage which all persons must have
in the entire settlement of the matter in litigation, it is founded on
convenience; and is therefore made to yield in cases of necessity,
or where it would be attended with any inconvenience which may
be safely avoided; upon the ground of their being a common interest
among creditors, which any one of them may sufficiently represent;
and to avoid the great inconvenience of making all of them parties,
any one has been allowed to file a bill for himself, and in behalf of
all others of his co-creditors. But, as regards the defendants to a
creditor's suit, the general rule would lead, in administering the
assets of a deceased person, to taking notice of his credits, and
following his estate beyond his personal representatives; and, con-
sequently, to the bringing forward of his debtors; yet the practice
of the court has prescribed bounds to the inquiry; and accordingly
the rule is to stop short at the personal representatives of the de-
ceased, unless the justice due to the plaintiffs, or the peculiar
circumstances of the case, should require others to be called in. (r)

The personal estate being the primary and natural fund for the
payment of debts, must be first resorted to, even for the satisfac-
tion of debts due to the state, as well as to individuals, so far as it
remains and can be found, (s) And if that estate be insufficient,
there can, with propriety, be no other person than the executor or
administrator of the deceased, made defendant to a creditor's suit.
But if the bill alleges, or it can be shewn, that the deceased debtor
left no personal estate, or that it had been exhausted or wasted, or
by any means become insufficient for the payment of the debts of
the deceased; and that he left real estate, then all the heirs and

(r) Holland v. Prior, 7 Cond. Cha. Rep. 22.—(s) Magna Charta, c. 18; Kilty's
Rep. 205; 2 Inst 18 and 32; Evelyn v. Evelyn, 2 P. Will. 664, note; Mogg v.
Hodges, 2 Ves. 52; Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. 518; S. C. 1 Meriv. 220; The King
v. Hopper, 1 Exche. Rep. 280; Brogden v. Walker, 2 H. & J. 204, Although by
the law of some other countries, the lands as well as every other kind of property of
the debtor are, as at this time in Maryland, alike liable for the payment of his debts,
whether due by simple contract or otherwise; yet every where the personal OF
moveable estate of the debtor seems to have been considered as the primary fund,
which was to be first applied in payment of debts, so far as it would go, in aid of
the land or real estate of the debtor; Bowaman v. Reeve, Prec. Cha. 577; Anony-
mous, 9 Mod. 66; Vattel, b. 1, c. 7; Code Napol by Barret, Introd. 328; 7 Peters-
dorff, Abr. 527, note.