342 HAMMOND v. HAMMOND.

Hence it appears, that by the operation of these last mentioned
acts of assembly, and which, it is clear, from a consideration of

on this consideration: that on an application by creditors for the sale of an infant's
estate, it is a matter of sound discretion, whether or not the Chancellor will decree
a sale. He is governed by circumstances. In case of a debt due from the ancestor
or devisors jointly with another who is solvent, the Chancellor might say, I will not
decree a sale, or I will not suffer you to receive your debt from the infant's estate ;
because you have it in your power, or had it in your power, since the ancestor's or
devisor's death, to recover your whole claim from the other debtor. But the Chan-
cellor conceived that to avoid circuity of action, and do justice to all, it was proper
to charge the infant only his just proportion, or to admit the claim against the estate
for only a just proportion. Were Garnet, William Clayton, and Nathan Wright all
insolvent ? Was one of them solvent, and the others not ? Have any steps been
taken to recover from them ? It is certain, perhaps, that they are now protected by
the act of limitations; but is this a reason wherefore Edward Clayton's estate is to
be charged with the whole ?

It would have been more satisfactory to the Chancellor to have had the claim ex-
hibited to him in the beginning, instead of the petitioners prosecuting a suit at law
against the administrator de bonis non. He is not even clearly satisfied how the
claim has been ascertained against that administrator.

The Chancellor is under the impression, that he long since suggested verbally the
points in this case; and the proofs which were necessary. He is under an impres-
sion, that besides other papers, which are now missing, was the argument in writing
of counsel. However, he has now fully explained his ideas, and suggested his
doubts and wishes to have all the proof which can be obtained, to hear the counsel,
and to put an end to the case as speedily as possible. He has not yet had it in his
power to decide on the true merits.

It is now proper to say something of the claim of William Hemsley and Peregrine
Tilghman. Solomon Clayton having, as is proved to the Chancellor's satisfaction,
passed a bond to them, in consideration of a debt due from Edward Clayton, they
did not thereby lose their lien on Edward Clayton's land, but gained an additional
security, and all Solomon's lands are liable. As to the land coming from Edward
Clayton, they are to be preferred to all the creditors, except the present petitioners.
As to Solomon's land, if any there be, which did not come from Edward, they are on
a footing with other creditors. The petitioners, having a claim against Edward's
estate only, can have no title to be paid out of that part of Solomon's land, if any
there be, which did not come from Edward.

The case was again brought before the Chancellor by the trustee for further direc-
tions, and praying that his trust and the whole proceedings might be brought to a
close.

8th March, 1805.—HANSON, Chancellor.—No cause has ever been before the Chan-
cellor in which he has had so much trouble in examining the proceedings, and
making statements and orders, and instructions in writing, in order that the merits
of the several claims might be brought fairly before him. He has suffered great
uneasiness on account of that delay which has taken place, which may appear to be
unaccountable, but which has been owing to the negligence, inattention, or igno-
rance, or all combined of the parties themselves. In the beginning all the claims
exhibited were merely against Solomon Clayton, as if the debts were originally due
from Mm. Had that been the case the proceeds of the sale would have been pro-
perly divided amongst the claimants in due proportion, and a considerable part of