330 HAMMOND v. HAMMOND.

Formerly, in equity as well as at law, where a suit was brought
against an infant heir, or against coparceners, any one of whom

in the absence of Hollingsworth's counsel; but it was because his counsel did not
attend the appointment which had been made; and because the suit, after some de-
lay, was submitted, without argument to the Chancellor. The Chancellor, on revision
of the papers, conceives that he was perfectly correct in decreeing the real estate of
the deceased to be sold; and likewise in ordering a new sale. It appears that the
claims, fully established, exceed the amount of the sales several thousand dollars,
and that no opposition was made by the defendants to a second sale; and that the
said petition contain the only objection which has been made to the proceedings.
The Chancellor saw no reason then, wherefore the second sale should not take place.
However, on the petition of the said Hollingsworth, it is Ordered, that the sale adver-
tised by the trustee, Samuel Chase, be postponed until further order.

As Mrs. Hollingsworth is the sole representative of Mr. Parkin with respect to
both real and personal estate; and as whatever surplus of the money arising from the
sale of either would belong to her, the Chancellor did not hesitate to do justice to the
creditors, by passing such a decree as would provide effectually for the discharge of
their claims, without injury to the defendants. Indeed he conceived that his decree was
calculated to benefit the defendants, full as much as the creditors of Parkin. Sup-
pose, for illustration, actions at law, brought by the creditors. On the papers in this
cause, it is by no means clear, that when the decree was passed, the Chancellor had
any power over the bank shares. If the defendants wish to apply them to the pay-
ment of Parkin's debts, they, most assuredly, can do so of their own accord. Dor-
mant claims are such as have not been announced to the debtor, or person chargeable
with them. It is not proper to call a claim against Parkin dormant, merely because
it was not exhibited in this court until it was called for. In short, the Chancellor is
fully satisfied of the propriety of all his proceedings in this cause, prior to the peti-
tion aforesaid. If the proceeds of the sales, already made, with what the defendants
shall voluntarily apply, shall be inadequate to the discharge of all the claims here
exhibited and established, the Chancellor must assuredly do his duty in directing a
new sale.

On the first of February, 1805, Jesse Hollingsworth and wife filed a bill here
against these plaintiffs, Nathan Tyson and others, for the purpose of having the sale
of the real estate, made under this decree, annulled. The defendants answered, the
case was brought to a hearing; and the bill was dismissed by a decree of this court;
which decree was, on appeal, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that
the defect in a certain deed, which formed an essential link in the chain of title, had
been cured by the act of 1807, ch. 62, just then passed, and while the case had been
held under advisement by that court. 2 H. & J. 230.

After which, the trustee who had been appointed to make the sale, by his petition,
referring to this suit, and exhibiting a copy of the decree of the Court of Appeals,
prayed that the decree of the 30th of December, 1803, might be executed.

14th January, 1808.—KILTY, Chancellor.—In regard to that part of this petition
which relates to the personal estate, the Chancellor is, at present, under the impres-
sion that the decree for account of the personal estate will comprehend all the assets
on hand at the time of the decree, and since received up to the time of taking the
accounts. The decree being confirmed, the auditor will, of course, proceed to take
the accounts, after giving notice as directed thereby; and on his report it will appear
what assets are unaccounted for; and such decision will be made thereon as may
appear proper. The trustee will, on the affirmation which has taken place, proceed,