CONTEE v. DAWSON. 297

tees in remainder all interest or dividends received by the trustees
from the investment, and to which Margaret R. Clerklee had be-
come entitled.

But it now appears by an account between the late trustees and
their agent, reported by the auditor as part of the proofs laid before
him, that a large amount of interest on the legacy of £ l,500 had
accumulated in the hands of the executors of the testatrix Ann
Russell, which had been paid by them, with the principal, to the
trustees who had invested the whole accordingly as capital, after
deducting the costs and charges of the transaction. These addi-
tional facts give rise to the objection, that the interest, which
accrued upon the legacy from the death of the testatrix to the
time of the investment, belonged exclusively to Margaret R. Clerk-
lee the tenant for life; and, not being a part of the capital, directed
Jo be invested, must be deducted from the amount which the late
trustee William Dawson acknowledged he had received,

I conceive it to have been the intention of the testatrix to allow
a reasonable time to the trustees to make an investment of this
legacy as directed; and that all its accumulations in the hands of
her executors, in the way of interest, were to be considered as par-
cels of its principal, and to be invested, as such, by the trustees when
paid to them. It is true, that where there has been any unreason-
able delay in making such an investment, or the tenant for life
would, by being postponed until it was actually made, be mate-
rially injured, he has been allowed the accruing interest from the
end of one year after the death; but here no such unforeseen or
injurious delay has been alleged or shewn, (v) The testatrix gave
to the late Margaret R. Clerklee during her life, only the dividends
arising from the investment, not the interest on the sum of £1,500.
There is a material distinction between the interest on money, and
dividends on stock. Interest accumulates from day to day; but
the dividends on stock are made payable on certain days like rent;
and therefore, on the death of the tenant for life, interest would be
calculated up to the very day of the death; but of dividends there
could be no such exact apportionment; the amount not actually
payable at the time of the death of the tenant for life, would go to
him in remainder. And therefore, in general, when the interest,
dividends, or profits of stock are given to one for life, nothing

(v) Gibson v. Bott 7 Ves. 89.