290 CONTEE v. DAWSON.

all the consequences tnereof; unless he, or at this time, his execu-
trix, can shew that he was induced to make the sale and transfer
by the cestui que trusts, who were then competent to recommend
and to sanction the transaction.

The interest of the cestui que trust, Margaret R. Clerklee, ex-
tended only to the profits and dividends of the invested legacy
during her life, to dispose of as a fame sole; and therefore, as it has
been proved, that she advised and required the change to be made,
she might have been bound to submit to any loss sustained by
reason of the transfer. But the consent of her children to the sale,
which has been so much relied on, was given, if at all, during her
life-time; and consequently, before any interest whatever had vest-
ed in them. The direction of the legacy toward them was, at that
time, a mere possibility; they might, none of them, have survived
their mother; and if they had, still they might, all of them, have
died before they became entitled to take; in which case the legacy
went over to John Clerk. The children of Margaret R. Clerklee
during her life, were then the mere apparent, but by no means
the actual cestui que trusts of this legacy. And having nothing
more than a possibility or expectancy, without even the shadow of
an absolutely vested interest, they had nothing to release, nor any
estate which they could require or authorize the trustee to dispose
of or transfer. And therefore, even supposing the proofs had estab-
lished the fact, that they had each one, being competent to con-
tract, required the transfer to be made; yet as it was made before
any right whatever had accrued to them, it could not be deemed a
sound and available sanction of the conduct of this trustee. For
the relinquishment of a mere expectancy, as the release of an heir
apparent during the life of the ancestor is absolutely void, (r)

If, however, these daughters had been sole and nearly of full
age, and had by misrepresentation, concealment, or any fraudulent
means induced the trustee to make this transfer; and the trustee
had made it under a confident and honest, but erroneous reliance
on their assurances, he certainly could not now be made to bear
any loss which ensued in consequence thereof, (s) But the defen-
dant Philip A. L. Contee admits, that the claim to a share of this
legacy which had devolved upon him, in right of his wife,
been satisfied; and there is no proof whatever, that any of lie

(r) Co. Litt 265; Thomas v. Freeman, 2 Vern. 563; Jones v. Roe, 3 T. R. 93.—
(t} Cory v. Gertcken, a Mad. Rep. 40.