280 CONTEE v. DAWSON.

age part, and by reason of the devise over. By which the testator
manifested his intention to impose a penalty upon such a fraudu-
lent attempt; and not because of the other and the quaint conceit
assigned as a reason, that when the legacy was once vested in the
devisee over, .equity could not fetch it back again. For the mix-
ture of good and ill together makes the whole bad; the truth is
obscured by the falsehood; the virtue drowned by the vice. And
there are many instances both at law and in equity, where the
whole of a just claim may be lost, because of a fraud against others,
or the playing of a trick to come at it. (x)

Considering this decision as resting upon this ground, that the
testator and the court imposed and enforced the forfeiture to pre-
vent and punish a fraudulent attempt to obtain a double or unjust
proportion of an estate, it will be found to accord in principle with
a legal provision which has received, for a length of time, the reite-
rated approbation of the general assembly of this state; besides
having had, in other countries, for ages past, the sanction of a very
large and enlightened portion of mankind. By a provision of one
of the annual insolvent laws, (y) which has been often re-enacted,
and is now the standing law of the state, it is declared, that if a
creditor, to whom a real debt is due, shall collude with the debtor
to gain an undue preference, or for concealment of any part of the
debtor's estate, or shall concert any acknowledgment of the debtor,
or any kind of security, to give false colour to his claim for more
than is bona fide due, such creditor, shall lose his debt truly due; (z)
evidently, as a punishment for his fraudulent and corrupt attempt
to prejudice or cheat others. A similar legal provision forms a
part of the code of England, Scotland, France, Spain, and Hin-
dostan. (a)

Taking this view of the subject, it is clear, that a mere devise
over will not, in all cases, cause the forfeiture to be enforced on a
suit's being brought; but, it must clearly appear, from the nature
of the case, that the institution of the suit can only be considered
as the commencement or partial execution of a corrupt and fraudu-
lent design to injure others, or those to whom, in such an event,
the legacy is given over. For it would be a strange inconsistency

(x) Co. Litt 85, a.; Hitchcock v. Sedgwick, 2 Vern. 162; Dalbiac v. Dalbiac, 16
Ves. 125; Wimbish v. Tailbois, 1 Plow. 54.—(y) 1791, ch. 73, s. 11.—(z) 1805, ch.
110, s. 12.—(a) Cooper's Bank'r Law, Adden. 12, 18; Kames' Prin. Eq. b. 3, c. 5,
page 455, note 457,