ELLICOTT v. WELCH. 247

ingly, with a due proportion of interest that has been or may be
received.

William Gaither and Joshua Warfield, for themselves and in
behalf of the other creditors of Nicholas Welch, deceased, on the
25th of August, 1829, filed their petition in this case, in which
they stated, that the late Nicholas Welch, being indebted to Gai-
ther, died leaving real and personal estate; that administration
having been granted on the personal estate of the late Nicholas to
the petitioner Joshua Warfield, he, Gather, sued Joshua, and ob-
tained an absolute judgment against him; and that Joshua being
also the surety of the late Nicholas, he, Gaither, had moreover
sued and obtained a judgment against him on that ground. Upon
which it was prayed that the petitioners might be allowed to come
in as creditors, &c.

26th August, 1829.—BLAND, Chancellor.—The case with this
petition having been submitted without remark the proceedings
were read and considered.

It is admitted, that the judgments which this petitioning credi-
tor Gaither recovered against the administrator of the late Nicholas
Welch were absolute. This admission is alone sufficient to pre-
clude him from any claim upon the real assets in the hands of the
heirs of the deceased debtor; because, such judgments are con-
clusive evidence of a sufficiency of personal assets in the hands of
the administrator to satisfy the claim. And that too as well be-
tween such creditor and the heirs of the deceased debtor, as
between such creditor and the administrator of the deceased
debtor. Because, if, notwithstanding such a judgment, the cre-
ditor were allowed to recover against the heir, leaving the judg-
ment as against the administrator unimpeached, and it surely can-
not be revised, impaired, or reversed in a court of equity, then the
judgment standing as conclusive evidence against the administrator
of a sufficiency of assets, the heir must be allowed, according to
the doctrine of substitution, to take the place of such creditor, and
to reimburse himself by proceeding upon the judgment against
the administrator, (f) Which would be, in effect, to compel the
parties to have recourse to a singular circuity of remedy; or to
divest a judgment of some of its legal consequences; or to deter-

(f) Clifton v. Burt, 1 P. Will. 680; Edwards v. Countess Warwick, 2 P.
Will. 175.