WINDER v. DIFFENDERFFER. 199

shalled so as to satisfy all, or to leave the loss to fall where it must
rest according to the positive rules of law; or by the aid of the
general principles of equity arising out of some fraud or injustice
practised, or participated in by the plaintiffs, or those under whom
they claim.

It is a well settled general rule, that no one can be allowed to
intrude himself upon another as his surety; and therefore if a man
voluntarily pays the debt of another, without any agreement to that
effect with the debtor, he cannot take the place of the creditor, or
in any way recover the money so paid of the debtor; because the
law does not permit one man thus, officiously, and without solici-
tation, to intermeddle with the affairs of another, (y) The only
exception to this general rule is, where, on a bill of exchange
being dishonored, a third person, not a party to it, may pay it for
the honor of the drawer, or any of the endorsers. The reason of
allowing this exception is, that it induces the friends of the drawer
or endorsers to render them this service; and by that means pre-
serves the honor of commerce, and the credit of the trader, (z) But
where one, by express contract, becomes bound as a surety for the
payment of the debt of another, or as an insurer against loss, then
if the surety or insurer pays the whole debt, or reimburses the loser
he thereby intitles himself to demand a full assignment or subroga-
tion of all the securities of the creditor or insured; and has a right,
in all respects, to be substituted for the creditor or insured, so as to
enable him to obtain re-imbursement from his principal, (a)

This general right of a surety has, to a certain extent, been af-
firmed by an act of assembly, (6) and this court has so entirely ap-
proved of the doctrine as to allow a surety, who had paid the
whole purchase money, to have the benefit of the equitable lien of
the vendor; (c) and also to allow a surety in a custom-house bond,

(y) Stokes v. Lewis, 1 T. R. 20.—(z) Chitty on Bills, 164.—(a) Randal v. Cock-
ran, 1 Ves. 98; Ex parte, Rushforth, 10 Ves. 414; Pothier Obli. p. 2, c. 6, art. 4;
Just. Inst. by Cooper, 612.—(6) 1763, ch. 23, s. 8.

(c.) MELUY v. COOPER.—This bill was filed on the 7th of December, 1803; it
states that a mill, &c. the property of James Tilghman, had been sold under a de-
cree of this court, by Hugh Sherwood, as trustee; that James Cooper became the
purchaser, who agreed to receive the plaintiff, Meluy, as a joint purchaser with him
of the one half; each to pay one half of the purchase money; that Cooper took pos-
session and died, without having paid any part of the purchase money; that the
whole purchase money had been since paid by the plaintiff, but no deed bad been
obtained from the trustee, Sherwood; and that the plaintiff has a lien on Cooper's
half for the purchase money, which he, the plaintiff, became bound as surety to pay,