192 WINDER v. DIFFENDERFFER.

by an objection to his competency, which must be raised at the
hearing, when his deposition is offered to be read in evidence; (c)
so here, I shall for the future regard it as a settled principle,
governing the practice of this court, that no objection, coming from
a party to the suit, to the competency of a witness, or to the rele-
vancy of any interrogatory, or of any testimony shall be allowed to
suspend or impede the taking of the proofs. Such objections may,
however, be noted by the commissioners in their proceedings, as
has been the practice heretofore; (d) and whether so noted or not,
they may be made, heard, and determined upon at the final hear-
ing, (e)

But if it appears, that such an objection has been made, at any
time, previous to the hearing, either before the commissioners, the
auditor, or a justice of the peace, authorized by a special order to
take testimony, it must be considered as sufficient notice to put the
opposite party upon his guard to meet and repel it, either by a
release at the time, so as then, as in cases at common law, imme-
diately to remove the influence of interest from the mind of the
witness; or to overcome the objection if he can by other proof. But
if no such release be then given, nor other proof be then taken;
and it should appear, it the hearing, that the witness was interested
the objection must be sustained, and he cannot be then released
and re-examined; nor can the hearing of the case be postponed for
the purpose of taking any other proof, of which the party had been
thus apprised, might be called for; and which it had been in his
power to have taken and brought in; as it must be presumed, that
he had waived the benefit of that of which he had failed to avail him-
self, and of which he had had full knowledge. (f) It is, in general,

(c) Lee v. Atkinson, 2 Cox. 413; Murray v. Shadwell, 2 Ves. and Bea. 405.

(d) COCKEY v. HAMMOND.—25th of January, 1775.—The plaintiff's second inter-
rogatory to be asked of Lancelot Todd, is; 'Are you to gain or lose any thing in
case the decree in chancery is for, or against the complainant John Cockey ?' And
then just previous to the heading of the commissioners* return is the following
entry, 'Mr. Hammond the defendant, objects to the testimony of Lancelot Todd, as
being interested in the event of the cause; and, therefore, desires he may not be
examined on his interrogatories.' After which, follows Todd's deposition, in which
he answers thus, 'secondly, that he was not to gam or lose anything by a decree in
chancery in favour of the complainant.' Nothing further appears in the case, as to
this objection.—Chancery Proceedings, lib. W. K. No, 1, fol. 829, .

(e) Strike's Case, 1 Bland 96; Harwood v, Harwood, 1806, per Kilty, Chancellor,
M, S.; Johnson v. Berry, 1810, per Kilty, Chancellor, M. S.—(f) Callaghan v.
Rochfort, 3 Atk. 643; Vaughan v. Worrall, 2 Swan, 400,