WINDER v. DIFFENDERFFER. 187
of a witness arising from infamy, or the like, may be known; I
yet his interest, or any incompetency deducible from his own dis-
closures cannot be known; and therefore it is, that articles of im-
peachment are allowed to be filed after publication, as all such
matters are until then sealed up in secret. (j) And besides, even
if such a course were allowed to a party, the delays he might in-
terpose, by such objections, might be multiplied without end; and,
by a sinister ingenuity, a cause might be interminably procrasti-
nated. Hence there is no trace to be found in the English books
of any such objections ever having been attempted to be made.
It is a fundamental principle of our law, in criminal matters,
that the accused shall have a public trial; and it is manifestly
beneficial to all, that the administration of justice, as well civil as
criminal, should be open and public in every stage, and in all its
branches. It is one of the greatest safeguards of the rights of the
citizen, that all judicial officers should be subjected to the salutary
influence of public opinion; while on the other hand publicity is
the best and the strongest protection, that an upright faithful
officer can have or desire, (k) This publicity of judicial proceed-
ing which existed in all parts of Europe governed by the Roman
law; (l) and under those governments which arose immediately
out of the fall of the Roman empire, was first abolished, by the
papal decretals, towards the close of thirteenth century. The Pope
believed, that the secrecy of judicial proceedings would furnish
him with a more certain means of extirpating heretics; and the
civil tribunals adopted, in succession, an innovation which relieved
them from public censure, by concealing the errors they were liable
to commit; while the veil of mystery, which enveloped their pro-
ceedings, was calculated, in the eyes of the vulgar, to invest them
with an air of greater importance, (m) The English Chancellors,
( j) Purcell v. McNamara, 8 Ves. 326.—(k) King v. Daly, 1 Ves. 270. In the
matter of Lord Portsmouth, Coop. Rep. 106. The Chancellor's case, 1 Bland, 681,
note; 4 Laing's His. Scotland, 254. 'It is, however, to publicity more than to every
thing else put together, that the English system of procedure owes its being the
least bad system as yet extant, instead of being the worst. It is for want of this essen-
tial principle, more than anything else, that the well meant labours of Frederick and
Catherine, in the field of justice, have fallen so far short of the mark at which they
aimed,' per Bentham, Park. Hist. Co. Chan. 5. 'I know that it is one of the best
securities for the honest exercise of a judge's duty, that he is to discharge that duty
in public.'—Per Eldon, Chancellor; Wellesley v. Beaufort, 3 Cond. Chan. Rep. 9.—
(l) Adam's Rom. Ant. 241, 255; Kennett's Rom. Ant. 153:—(m) 1 Hallam's Mid.
Ages, ch. 7; 1 Lond. Jurist, 251
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