BINNEY'S CASE. 155

place within, or at which their work must terminate. The great,
the sole purpose of this act is to cause a navigable canal to be
made 'from the tide of the river Potomac, in the District of Col-
umbia,' over to the river Ohio; and this act of incorporation must
be construed with reference to that great object, so far as regards
the matter now under consideration, (o)

The termination, now in controversy, is no otherwise described
than by the expression, 'from the tide of the river Potomac, in the
District of Columbia' The tide, thus designated, is a large space;
and the surveys, which have been exhibited in this case, demon-
strate, that it is perfectly practicable to extend this canal along,
and to terminate it at any one point of the whole of this space of
tide. The canal may be stopped precisely at the head of tide;
but this, it is admitted, would not be altogether correct, or cer-
tainly not for the best. It is said, that it should descend to, and
be terminated at good practicable tide navigation. Again, it is
clear, that the canal may be conducted up the valley of Rock
creek, and, so round Washington, to the Eastern branch, and enter
the tide near Bladensburg; or thence, descending along the left
bank of that river, it may unite with the tide opposite or below
Washington. This, however, it is pronounced with one voice,
and at once, would be absurd. I admit it to be so. But it is never-
theless, a very illustrative absurdity. It clearly shews, that the
phrase here used is neither to be taken literally, nor wholly without
limit; but must, of necessity, be controlled by the nature of the
subject spoken of. A termination exactly at the first tide to be
met with among the rocks at the foot of the falls; or in the shal-
low tide near Bladensburg, it is confessed by all, would be inju-
rious; and an union, by a great circuit, with the bold, deep tide
which washes the left margin of the Eastern branch, or the Poto-
mac river, it is declared would be absurd.

There is, therefore, a large range of the tide at which this canal
might be terminated, that must be rejected. The tide spoken of,
it is evident, is circumscribed to a given place, a pool to which the
canal ought to come, and beyond which it ought not to be allowed
to go. Rejecting then, all that space of the tide of the District of
Columbia, within which it would be confessedly inconvenient or
absurd to fix upon as a termination for it, it will be necessary to

(o) 1 Blac. Com. 61; New River Company v. Graves, 2 Vern. 431; Curling v,
Chalklen, 3 M. & S. 510.