BINNEY'S CASE. 149

may be restrained, by injunction, from making such illegal expen-
ditures any where, the courts of justice of each government must
be allowed to have equal and concurrent jurisdiction. Under the
articles of union between England and Scotland, it is admitted,
that there may be cases in which it would be difficult or impossible
to do justice, unless the courts of the several states gave aid to
each other; and so co-operated within their respective jurisdictions,
from which all other judicial power is excluded, as to reader the
judgments of the tribunals of each state effectual within their pro-
per spheres, (a) So in this country, under the limited nature of our
federal union, it is perfectly obvious, that, in cases of this kind,
without a proper degree of comity and mutual aid, evils may arise
from the conflicting adjudications of the separate, co-ordinate and
independent courts, which must be allowed to take cognizance of
such matters; because of there being no common tribunal, in the
last resort, by which their different determinations may be harmo-
nized. Yet, such an exercise of jurisdiction, with all its probable
evils, must of necessity be allowed, since there would, otherwise,
be a total failure of justice. (6) For these reasons, the defendant's
objection to the jurisdiction of this court, as relates to its power to
inquire into the propriety of expenditures within the District of
Columbia, may be entirely put aside.

Supposing that they might fail of making good their two first
grounds of defence, these defendants have presented a third, upon
which they mainly rely. They insist, that they are fully authorized
to extend their works, as projected, within the District of Colum-
bia; that, this dam, being necessary and proper for that legitimate
purpose, may well be erected under that authority; and that they
ought not to be judicially prevented from erecting it accordingly.
The parties, in relation to this point, ranging far a field in ver-
bal criticism, and taking it for granted, that the act of incorporation
was so excessively ambiguous, as to require all manner of assistance
to reach its meaning, have carefully gathered up almost all the say-
ings and doings of the originators, advocates, and meddlers in
what they have called, 'the great enterprise,' and adduced them to
shew what is, what was intended to be, and what this court should
pronounce to be the true intent, and meaning of this act of incorpo-

(a) Kennedy v. Cassillis, 2 Swan. 322.—(6) The Charitable Corporation v. Sut-
ton, 2 Atk. 406; S. C. 9, Mod. 356; Barnesly v. Powel, 1 Ves. 287, Coysgarne v.
Jones, Amb. 613.

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