BINNEY'S CASE. 135

The c making large canals,' therefore, can only mean such as
were to be made originally, and in the first instance. If the pro-
prietors and the company could agree € concerning the just propor-
tion of the expenses,' those canals, when about to be laid out, were
to be made to suit both objects, instead of that one only, the neces-
sary dimensions for which are specified; that is, if upon agreement
any increase in the specified dimensions of the canal to answer the
additional purpose should be determined upon, an estimate of the
expense was to be made; and ' the just proportion of the expenses
of making large canals or cuts capable of carrying such quantities of
water as may be sufficient for the purposes of navigation, and also
for any such water works,' as the proprietors of the mill-sites might
desire to erect, should be then finally ascertained. The two pur-
poses were to be answered at once, and in the beginning by their
^making large canals.' How large over and above that which was
declared to be sufficient for navigation alone, is no otherwise speci-
fied, than by declaring, that it should be ' capable of carrying such
quantities of water as maybe sufficient for both purposes.'

Hence, it is perfectly manifest, that the legislature had meditated
upon the incompatibility of answering the two purposes, of navi-
gation and mills, to an unlimited extent from the same canals; and
had guarded against it by thus unequivocally declaring, that the
canal should be commensurate to both purposes. The legislature
did not leave it in the power of any proprietor of land, by with-
holding his consent, or refusing to enter into a reasonable agree-
ment, to prevent the corporation from making a canal of the speci-
fied dimensions for navigable purposes; for, to meet any such
opposition, it is provided, that a jury may be called and his land
condemned; because the new line of navigation being a highway,
and dedicated to public uses, such condemnation might rightfully
be made, by virtue of that eminent domain, which has been tacitly
conceded to the government over all private property.

But although a great and eminent balance of good to the public
has authorised the violation of private property under every mode
of government in the world; (f) yet, in such cases, even the greatest
of despots has been irresistibly struck with the justice of the de-
mand for an adequate compensation, (u) But the construction of '
mills, the enhancement of the value of private property, and the
aggrandisement of individuals alone, without any view to the pub-

(f) Godwin's Pol. Just. b. 3, c. 3.—(w) Tacitus Ann. b. 1, s. 75.