BINNEY'S CASE. 131

a mill,' or as such a situation which the owner 'may design to im-
prove.' The sort of place spoken of is, thus, clearly specified and
ascertained; and the owner is described, as ' the person possessor
of such a situation;' that is, as a person who is the possessor of a
mill-site. But a natural mill-site may exist, and yet no one, or any
two or more individuals may be the legal owners of it; because, a
natural mill-site being incapable of division, if any portion of the
land necessary for the head and tail race, and the position of the
mill be separated from the rest, by being held in severally by dif-
ferent owners, there exists, in fact, no legal right in any one to
such natural mill-site. And certainly the legislature could never
be understood to say of any one, 'that he may design to improve,'
any property to which he has no legal right, in any way it might
be improved, if other parcels were united with it, and the whole
were held altogether by one and the same owner.

This plaintiff founds his claim, under this section, upon the fact
of his being one of the 'persons possessors of such a situation.'
But, it appears, that this large tract of land binding on the river
Potomac, from the little falls to tide, was originally granted by the
state in distinct parcels to different persons; that it has undergone
since several divisions, and re-unions; and that it does not appear,
from any thing in the case, to what separate parcel this plaintiff is
entitled; nor does it appear, whether the parcel he owns is sufficient
to constitute a mill-site; and was so held by him, or those under
whom he claims, at the time this act was passed, without any divi-
sion, or alienation of any of its necessary constituent parts, since
that time; nor is there any thing in the case which shews who
were the possessors of mill-sites in the year 1784, or when this
suit was instituted, or at any other time.

'It is the intention of this act, not to interfere with private pro-
perty, but for the purpose of improving and perfecting the said
navigation.' The kinds of 'private property,' here referred to,
were the unimproved mill-sites, which had been previously desig-
nated. This act, by means of the work, which it gave authority
to construct, could interfere with a mill-site in only one of two
ways; either by preventing the water from reaching it, or by oc-
cupying the whole, or a material portion of the very mill-site itself.
These two modes of interference could be effected by only one
kind of work; that is, by a canal; because, this sentence must be
taken in connection with its context; and then it must be read
thus, at places through which it may be necessary to conduct ca-