BINNEY'S CASE. 119

may be formed into mill-sites, outside of his and in ruinous rival-
ship of it. This cause of complaint, it is believed, however,
assumes a principle of law for its basis, which has hitherto never
been gravely proposed to be acted upon by any one; much less
sanctioned by any of our courts of justice. It is said, in some of
the English books, that a new market, or ferry shall not be set up
so near an ancient one, as to draw away its custom* But it is no
nuisance or wrong for one man to erect a mill so near to that of
another as to draw away its custom; or to enter into competition
with it in any manner whatever, (b)

Supposing then it were true in point of law, as it is not, that the
defendants could lawfully appropriate their canal, from 1 down-
wards, to the purpose of a head race to a closely set row of mills
for several miles long, below, and outside of the mill-site of the
plaintiff; still, as their doing so would be lawful, the plaintiff
would have no legal cause of complaint, on the ground of the
depreciating effect thereof upon his mill-site. If the state grants a
patent and induces people to Jay out a great fund, it would, as has
been said, be wrong to grant a rival patent wantonly, (c) But it
would be bad policy, unjust and unconstitutional, as having the
effect of a monopoly, to prevent any one from making any use what-
ever of his own property, because of its operating as an injurious
rivalship of another who was not thereby in any way hindered from
making a similar or any other use of his property,

But, supposing all that has been said, in relation to the plaintiff's
legal rights to certain natural mill-sites, to be entirely erroneous;
and, that those claims are in all respects valid; then it follows,
from what he himself has stated, that the land, or a portion of it,
which is necessary to constitute those mill sites, lies in the route of
the proposed canal, and is about to be occupied by it. If so, it is
certain, that it may be condemned for that purpose in the manner
prescribed by the act of Assembly, (d) And in the valuation, so
directed to be made, all its worth, whether inherent, or incidental;
its value arising from its fertility and mineralogical contents, as
well as its value arising from its affording mill-sites or its peculiar
suitableness for any other purpose, should, and no doubt would be
duly considered and estimated under the inquisition and condem-

(6) 3 Blac. Com. 219; Hale de Port. Marts, 59, 60; Blessett v.;Hart, Willes Rep.
508.—(c) Exparte O'Reily, 1 Ves. jun. 114. The Vauxhall Bridge Company v.
Spencer, 2 Mad, Rep. 355. S. C. 4 Cond. Chan. Rep. 28.—(d,) 1824, ch. 79, s. 15.