116 BINNEY'S CASE.

is necessary to constitute a natural mill-site; and therefore, unless
an individual owns the whole of that land, he cannot be consi-
dered as the owner of the mill-site. Thus, suppose, that portion
of this land included within the lines A 4 9, belonged to X; and,
that another portion, included within the lines 8 10 C, belonged to
Y; and the residue to Z; it would be perfectly evident, that
neither of the three persons could be said to be the owner of the
mill-site; because neither could encroach or trespass upon the
other; and a portion of the land necessary for the head and tail
race being cut off, from the only suitable position for the mill,
neither of them could be considered as the owner of a mill-site.

This distinction between the natural existence of a mill-site, and
its being the separate property of an individual has been long ex-
pressly recognized, even in our statute book; as is shewn by
the act of assembly which declares, that any person who may be
desirous of building a forging mill upon land, next adjoining to
any run of water, of which he is not the owner, may obtain from
chancery a writ of ad quod damnum; and have it, to the extent of
one hundred acres, condemned to him for that purpose, (z)

The plaintiff alleges, 'that he is seized in his own right, and as
trustee for others, of certain lands, situate adjoining to the little
falls of the Potomac river, partly in Maryland, and partly in the
District of Columbia, beginning on the river at the head of the
little falls, and extending downwards; which property is naturally
possessed of great and peculiar advantages in the application of
water to mills.'

This is the whole, and the best description of the mill-site claimed
by the plaintiff, that I have been able to collect from the proceed-
ings. It may be admitted, that he is seized in his own right, and
as trustee for others; but how, and where the lands are situated
which he claims as his own, or which he holds as trustee for others
does not appear. A mill-site is a separate and entire thing, incapa-
ble of division; the land, of which it is naturally constituted, may
be held in joint tenancy, or in common; but the moment it is
divided and taken in severalty, the ownership of the mill-site is
gone, although its natural existence remains. It may be true, as
alleged, that the several parcels of land of which Amos Binney and
others are the separate owners, when taken together, may have
great advantages in the application of water power to mills; and

(z) 1719, ch. 15. Repealed by 1832, ch. 56.