104 BINNEY'S CASE

be to stop the erection, or further operation of a large and costly

work, it should appear, that the application has been made as

soon as the party became apprised of his rights, and the extent of

the injury with which they were threatened; or, at least, it must

not appear, from the bill itself, that t|ere had been any express or

tacit admission or acquiescence accounted for. (d)

A court of equity frequently refuses an injunction where it ac-

knowledges a right, when the conduct of the party complaining

has led to the state of things, that occasions the application; (e)

or, in other words, it grants or refuses an injunction, in many

cases, not upon of the right possessed by the parties;

but upon the ground of their conduct, and dealing before they

applied to the court for an injunction to preserve and protect that

right. (/)

If the equity of the bill be of a very dubious character; or if it
appears, from the magnitude, nature, and exigency of the case,
that the defendant should have an early opportunity of relieving
himself from the restriction, he is always, as in this instance,
apprised of it, by an order, sent with the writ, allowing a motion
to dissolve to be heard with or without answer; or on some short
notice after filing the answer, (g) The only mode, now in use, of
obtaining an injunction is by a bill; which should state a case of
a plain right, which is in probable danger of being irreparably
injured, or altogether defeated unless the injunction be granted as
prayed; or in some other more suitable form. The truth of the
facts set forth in the bill should be verified by the affidavit of the
plaintiff; or, as in this instance, by his agent, if he be not a resi-
dent of the state; or the Chancellor must, in some other manner,
be induced to trust the bill for the truth of its statements; (h) or
an injunction may be granted, on the equity admitted by the an-
swer after it conies in, although the bill has not been sworn to. (i)
An injunction bill, and indeed every other bill, whatever may be
* its nature, or object, assumes two propositions; first, that the
subject of it is of an equitable character, such as falls within the

(d) Jackson v. Petrie,10 Ves. 165; Birmingham Canal Comp. v. Lloyd, 18 Ves.
615; Crowder v. Tinkler, 19 Ves. 622; The Mayor of Colchester v. Lowten, 1 Ves.
& B. 246; Agar v. The Regents Canal Comp. Coop. 78; Mayor of King's Lynn v
Pemberton, 1 Swan. 250:(e) Rundell v. Murray, 4 Cond. Chan. Rep. 148.—
v (/) Wright v. Nutt, 1 H. Blac. 154; Blakemore v. The Glamorganshire Canal
* Navigation, 6 Cond. Chan. Rep. 551,—(g) Jones v. Magill, l Bland, 182.—(h) Ano-
nymous, 1 Vern. 120; Schermehorn v. L'Espenasse, 2 Ball. 364; The State of
Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Ball. 405.—(i) Wilson v. Wilson, 1 Desau. 224.