100 BINNEY'S CASE.

A grant of the power of eminent domain is one which must be construed strictly;
it cannot be exercised for any but a public purpose; and, in general, does not
admit of any repetition. The jurisdiction of this court in regard to persons or
things not within the state; and the uncontrolled concurrent jurisdiction of the
judiciary of this state, with that of the neighbouring states, in some peculiar
cases.—The estate in a canal, being in its nature, fixed realty; though declared to
be personalty, must, nevertheless, be governed by the law of the state in which the
canal is,—The termination of a canal at the tide in a certain district, must mean at
a convenient port in that district.—The usage as to the termination of canals.
The difference between river and canal navigation.

No parol proof, nor any part of the proceedings of either branch of the legislature,
can be admitted to explain the language of an act of Assembly j except as to pri-
vate acts, in which there may be a latent ambiguity.

On the 22d of June, 1829, Amos Binney, of Boston, in Massa-
chusetts, filed this bill against The President and Directors of the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company and Isaac .McCord, praying
for an injunction to prohibit the doing of certain acts, which, he
alleged, would be greatly and irreparably injurious to his rights and
property—and, on the same day, an injunction was granted as
prayed; with leave to the defendants to move for its dissolution, at
any time after filing their answers; on giving to the plaintiff, or his
solicitor, ten days notice thereof. Upon which an injunction was
issued accordingly*

On the 15th of July, 1829, the plaintiff filed his petition, in
which he stated, that the injunction after having been served, had
been disobeyed by the defendants—whereupon he prayed an attach-
ment, upon which, on the same day, writs of attachment were
ordered, and issued returnable forthwith. On the 21st of the same
month, the defendant McCord and John Martineau were brought
before the court under the attachment; when on recurring to the
petition, and its exhibits, it appeared, that there was, in fact, no
allegation of Martineau's having violated the injunction; nor any
prayer for an attachment against him—upon which it was moved,
that he might be immediately discharged—and he was discharged
accordingly; and the attachment quashed, as to him, with costs—
the court being then particularly engaged, it was agreed, that the
matter of the attachment against McCord should lay over, with an
understanding, that he should be permitted to go at large until called
for; but not to be considered as discharged from the process.

After which, some of the defendants filed their answers; and
gave notice of a motion to dissolve the injunction; which motion
was accordingly called up as being ready for hearing on the 8th of
August, 1829; and the plaintiff's solicitor admitted notice—but