STRIKE'S CASE. 81

plainants, cannot, therefore, consistently with that decree, be allow-
ed to stand as mortgages against them, to secure to Strike either
the amount of the improvements, or the advances in money he has
made to Rogers. Upon that ground Strike cannot stand, because
it is completely covered by the decree. This being the decided
opinion of the Chancellor, he might deem it unnecessary to notice
that class of cases which speak of allowances for improvements
and advances made by actual mortgagees, or by those pseudo pur-
chasers of young heirs and others, whose conveyances are allowed
by special favour, to stand and be considered as of the nature of
mere mortgages. Yet from the manner in which those cases have
been pressed forward, some further reasons, showing why they are
inapplicable to this case, may be expected.

In this case it must be distinctly and constantly recollected, that
Strike now claims reimbursement for his improvements and ad-
vances, not of Rogers, but out of the proceeds of the property in
question, and against the creditors of Rogers, who are here as the
complainants. All those cases of mortgages and pseudo purchases,
are governed alike by the same principles of equity. A separate
examination of each of them will therefore be entirely unnecessary.

In all, the bill is brought by the grantor against the grantee, or
between parties who stand precisely in that relation to each other,
to redeem the mortgaged property, or to set aside a conveyance
which had been improperly or fraudulently obtained. And on the
case being made out by the proofs, the tribunal has uniformly an-
swered to him who asked the relief, "you must do equity before
you shall obtain equity. It is true, you have been imposed upon
and defrauded—but it is no less true, that you have been partially
and in some degree benefitted; you have received money from your
opponent; he has permanently enhanced the value of your estate;
refund the money you have received, pay for the increased value
of your estate, and it shall be restored to you; the conveyances of
which you complain shall be annulled; until then they shall stand
as a security for those improvements and advances." Such is the
language of the Chancellor in those cases where he acts under the
influence of the maxim, that he who asks equity must do equity;
and this maxim is sanctioned and illustrated by an almost endless
variety of cases to be found in the books.

But the application of this maxim in these cases, and for the
most part, depends not only upon the immediate relationship be-
tween the parties of grantor and grantee, but also, almost always,

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