STRIKE'S CASE. 77

essential that it should most clearly and distinctly appear, that he
who claims an allowance for his losses, in the shape of compensa-
tion for improvements, should be entirely and absolutely free from
all blame; because equity never interferes in favour of a wrong-
doer. In cases where a bona fide possessor of property, one who
is ignorant of all the facts and circumstances relating to his adver-
sary's title, under a confident apprehension and belief, that he was
himself the true owner, proceeds to make improvements, and
increase the value of the subject so held, it seems to have been
almost universally admitted, that an allowance for such increased
value should be made, at least to the extent of the rents and pro-
fits. According to the Roman law, such a claim for improvements
may be extended to their full value, beyond the amount of the rents
and profits as against the improved subject itself, (n) And so, too,
according to the marine law, an account for meliorations is made,
if necessary, even beyond the profits; and for ascertaining the
amount, the rule is to consider the quantum of the improved state
in which the ship comes into the hands of the original proprietors;
for as to that part, it is not a restitution to them, but a new acqui-
sition, (o) But according to the English principles of equity, if the
true owner insists on an account of rents and profits, as he may,
not according to the value when the purchaser entered, but accord-
ing to the present value, the court will order an allowance to be
made for repairs and improvements.(p)

But where a man has acted fraudulently, and is conscious of a
defect in his title, or has bought a title notoriously bad at the time
of the purchase, in such a case, as a mala fide possessor, he is per-
mitted by no law to make any claim whatever for improvements;
he must take the consequences of his own imprudence. By the
Roman law it is declared, that if a man build with his own mate-
rials upon the ground of another, the edifice becomes the property
of him to whom the ground belongs, because the owner of the ma-
terials is understood to have made a voluntary alienation of them,
if he knew he was building upon another's land; and by the com-
mon law it is in general true, that where a tenant affixes any thing

(n) Dormer v. Forteseue, 3 Atk. 134; Pow. Mort. by Coven. 813, n. o; Kames'
Pri. Eq. b. 1, p. 1, s. 3; b. 3, c. 1; Just. Inst 1. 2, tit. 1, s. 29, & notes; Sag, T. &
P. 525; Savage v. Taylor, Fors. 234; Deane v. Izard, 1 Tern. 150; Shine v. Gough,
1 Ball & B. 444; Hardcastle v. Shafto, 1 Anstr. 185; Attorney General v. BaMol Coll.
9 Mod. 411; Webb v. Rorke, 2 Seho. & Lefr. 676.—(o) The Perseverance, f Rob.
23»; The Kierlighett, S Rob. 101; Nostra de Conceicas, 5 Rob, 294.—(p)
V. It P. 525.