be prosecuted for perjury, 137; Gibson
v. futon, 355.
The answer of one defendant cannot be
read in evidence for or against an-
other; except in some particular cases.
McKim v. Thompson, 160; Jones v.
Magill, 198; Lingan v. Henderson, 267;
Chase v. Manhardt, 336.
A wife cannot be a witness for or against
her husband, therefore her answer can
in no case affect him. Lingan v. Hen-
It is only under very special circumstances,
that a defendant can be allowed to make
any alteration in his answer. McKim
v. Thompson, 162.
An answer sworn to before a justice of the
peace, in another State, or in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, who is certified to be
a justice of the peace at the time, is re-
ceived as sufficient. Chapline v. Beatty,
197; Lingan v. Henderson, 240; Gibson
v. Milton, 352.
One defendant cannot directly compel his
co-defendant to answer, but he may, by
a rule further proceedings, urge forward
the plaintiff to extract an answer from
him. Jones v. Magill, 198.
If a defendant pleads and answers to the
same matter, iris answer overrules^ his
plea. Hannah K. Chase's case, 217.
If a defendant, in argument, relies upon
the answer of his co-defendant he there-
by makes it evidence against himself.
Chase v. Manhardt, 336.
When the case is set down for hearing on
the bill and answer alone, all the facts
set forth in the answer must be taken to
be true. Estep v. Watkins, 488.
The mode of taking the answer of an
adult, or an infant defendant in England
and in this State. Snowden v. Snow-
Exceptions to an answer being sustained,
the defendant was ordered to answer by
a certain day, or the bill to be taken
pro confesso. Mayer v. Tyson, 560,
An insufficient answer being as no an-
swer, the bill may be taken pro confesso
as against the defendant, and the plaintiff
be allowed to proceed with his case, 560.
The answer of a defendant may, by con-
sent, be received without oath. Bil-
lingslea v. Gilbert, 567.
A defendant, who, in his answer, insists
upon the statute of frauds, must never-
theless answer fully. Ogden v. Ogden,
If a defendant says nothing about the sta-
tute of frauds, he must be taken to have
renounced the benefit of it, 288.
It is a constitutional right of the citizen
to have his ease at Taw, or in equity
reviewed by a court of error. Ringgold's
case, 7 12.
A writ of error wag. at common law, de-
mandable of right in all civil cases;
and the proceedings in the court below
were stayed by a writ of supersedeas, 7.
The range of a writ of error limited to
certain errors in fact, or to errors in law
apparent upon the record: and could be
brought only upon a final judgment,
not rendered by default, or by consent,
or where the matter rested in the mere
discretion of the court, 8.
Regulations to prevent the abuse of the
right of appeal at common law, 9.
The right of appeal in equity is limited to
final decrees or to orders involving the
merits; it does not extend to such
orders as are merely interlocutory or to
decrees by consent 'or default, 12; Slye
v. Llewellen, 18; McKim v. Thomp-
On an appeal from chancery no new or
different point can be made in the court
of appeals. Ringgold's case, 14, 21.
The staying of proceedings in equity on
an appeal is a matter regulated in a
great degree by, and is very much
within the discretion of the court of
No appeal allowed in the inferior federal
courts but from a final decree, 16.
The right of appeal expressly given, and
confined to decretal orders, that is, to
such orders only from which an appeal
formerly lay, 17; McKim v. Thomp-
The penalty of the appeal bond to be in
double the sum decreed to be paid, or
the value of the perishable subject in con-
troversy. How adjusted when the value
is uncertain, 23; McKim v. Thomp-
The appeal bond approved by, not ac-
knowledged before the chancellor; but
if it does not cover the amount and con-
form to the decree or order, it is no su-
persedeas. Ringgold's case, 24.
An appeal bond may be approved either
on the chancellor's own knowledge of
the sufficiency of the obligors, or on the
certificate to that effect of a judge, a
justice of the peace, or a solicitor, 25.
A defendant against whom the bill had
been taken pro confesso not allowed to
come in for the purpose of taking an
appeal. Hoye v. Penn, 35.
Where no appeal would lie the legislature
refused to pass a special law authorizing
an appeal. McKim v. Thompson, 169.
It was said by the Senate to have been
admitted on all hands, that there could
be no appeal from an interlocutory order
directing a defendant to bring money
into court, 169.
Held by the chancellor, that an appeal
would not lie from an interlocutory order
to bring money into court, 172.
The execution of a decree will not be