642 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.

worthy and enlightened body of legislators Maryland ever saw.
On the 24th of November of that session, the Senate sent the fol-
lowing message to the House of Delegates:

" Gentlemen, We think it a duty incumbent on us to call your
attention to the state of our judiciary department. The thirtieth
article of our bill of rights, for very obvious and important rea-
sons, enjoins that the chancellor and judges should be independent,
not only by holding their commissions during good behaviour, but
also by having proper salaries secured to them during the continu-
ance of their commissions. It is the duty of the legislature both to
fix the salary of the chancellor and judges, and to provide funds
by a permanent law for the regular payment of such salaries. This
duty has not been complied with; and instead of being in that state
of independency required by the bill of rights, and strongly dictated
by the first principles of free governments, the chancellor and judges
have hitherto remained dependent for their salaries upon the annual
votes of the legislature. This House have been of opinion for a
considerable time past, that there was no circumstance which would
justify the legislature in delaying to make the provision required
by the constitution; and our opinion hath been ineffectually com-
municated to a former House of Delegates; but we trust, gentle-
men, you will concur with us in sentiment, that this very important
subject ought to be properly attended to early in this session; and
that you will in due time send us a bill for fixing the salaries of
the chancellor and judges, during the continuance of their com-
missions, and for the payment of those salaries with certainty and
regularity. The experience of past sessions induces us to appre-
hend we may find ourselves under the necessity of determining too
hastily, matters, by which the welfare of this State in particular,
and of the United States in general, may be essentially affected,
and which consequently demand the maturest consideration.

" Towards the close of each session, when from its length and
the approaching severity of the season the House of Delegates
have been usually anxious to rise, the most important part of the
public business hath been transmitted to the Senate. As the
Constitution does not allow this House to propose amendments to
money bills, the evil consequence must readily occur, if we should
think it necessary to dissent to them at a time when the House of
Delegates will not agree to continue sitting to reassume the discus-
sion of the subject matter of such bills, or even to enter into a
consideration of such amendments as the Senate may propose to