THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE. 621

But, upon the present occasion, it is that portion of the provi-
sions of this article, relating to judicial salaries, which alone claims

not to be assessed for the support of government; but every other person in the
State ought to contribute his proportion, of public taxes, for the support of govern-
ment, according to his actual worth, in real or personal property within the State;
yet fines, duties, or taxes may properly and justly be imposed or laid, with a political
view, for the good government and benefit of the community."—(Sloane v. Pawlett,
8 Mod. 18; Vattel, b. 2, s. 240, 252.)

Under the clause, which declares, that no Chancellor or Judge ought to receive
fees or perquisites of any kind, it is evident, that at least as regards them, justice
raust be administered gratis, however much or improperly it may be otherwise
encumbered with costs and expenses. But, as has been said, it was not so much to
diminish the expense, as to prevent the corruption of justice, that the judges were
prohibited from receiving any present, or fee from the parties. For, upon the impar-
tial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense which
he has of his own security. In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly
secure in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary,
that the judicial should be separated from the executive power; but that it should
be rendered as much as possible independent of that power. The judge should not be
liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of that power. The regu-
lar payment of his salary should not depend upon the good will, or even upon the
good economy of that power.—(Smith's Wea. Nat. b. 5, c. 1, pt. 2.)

It seems to be a generally received opinion, that the Chancellor and Judges have,
each of them, an estate, or a vested interest in their respective salaries, (Whittington
v. Polk. 1 H. & J. 236; Coop. Just. 599.) This estate in a judicial salary is, how-
ever, one of a very peculiar character; it is not subject, before it becomes due, to be
disposed of at the pleasure of the holder. It is like a limited and qualified estate in
an annuity. As where an annuity charged upon land was granted by Oliver to
Emsonne, in consideration of his, Einsonne's, giving his counsel to Oliver; it was
held, that the trust and confidence which Oliver reposed in Emsonne for his advice,
being incidental to the cause for which the annuity was granted it could not be
assigned to another or forfeited. (Oliver v. Emsonne, Dyer, 16.; 1 H. Blac. 627,
note; Maund's Case, 7 Co. 112; Co. Litt. 144 b. note 1.) So that looking to the pecu-
liar cause of the grant it appears, that even in the case of an annuity granted by one
person to another, the grantee may have vested in him nothing more than an inaliena-
ble and qualified estate.

But in deciding upon the nature of a. public grant, the great object of public policy
in making the grant must be attended to. The general intent pervades the whole ;
and each yearly payment of the salary must be subject to it. The public has a deep
interest in the due and appropriate application of judicial salaries as well as in their
regular continuance and payment; because they are given for services rendered to
the State of the most precious nature, by a class of the most important " trustees of
the public." Such salaries are granted to support the dignity of the State, and the
administration of justice; and therefore no judicial salary can be sold, assigned, mort-
gaged, or transferred, either by the act of the party, or by operation of law as in cases
of insolvency; because the public policy by,which any such voluntary or involuntary
alienation is prohibited is incidental to the cause for which it is granted; and cannot
be separated from it. One of the special objects in giving such a salary is to enable
the judge continually, and at all times to discharge his duties to the public without
interruption from any pecuniary embarrassment; for, although mere insolvency can-
not be considered, in all cases even as a deviation from duty, much less a crime; yet