THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE. 617

explored in every direction; and the soundest and most approved
political axioms were laid before that convention. It appears, that
none of those principles and solemn acts, in which their fellow-
citizens had taken a deep interest, were overlooked, or suffered to
escape their attention—of which the following comparison will
afford one, among the many proofs, that might be adduced.

In the Colonial Declaration of Rights of the 14th October, 1774,
among other things, it was declared, u that the respective colonies
are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to
the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of
the vicinage, according to the course of that law. That they are
entitled to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed at
the time of their colonization; and which they have, by experi-
ence, respectively found to be applicable to their several local and
other circumstances." By the third article of the Declaration of
Rights of this State, it is declared, " that the inhabitants of Mary-
land are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by
jury, according to the course of that law, and to the benefit of
such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their first
emigration, and which by experience have been found applicable
to their local and other circumstances."

This coincidence, of sense and language, could not have been
merely accidental; it therefore proves, that those several antece-
dent declarations of the rights, and of the independence of the
people of this country, were the sources whence many of the pro-
visions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights were almost literally
taken; that the complaints of the grievances, arising from a
dependent and subservient judiciary, as expressed in the previous
Declarations of 1765, of 1774, and of 1776, were then actually
before the Maryland convention; and, that the judicial indepen-
dency, spoken of in our constitution, was intended to be analogous
to, but more perfect, than that specified in the English statute of
1700, which had become so well understood, and was so solemnly
and generally approved. In a word, it is manifest, from all the
public" acts, discussions, and circumstances of those times, that
the thirtieth article of our Declaration of Rights must be regarded
as the condensed expression of those opinions and principles,
relative to judicial independency', to establish and sustain which all
united America fought, bled, and triumphed.

Such is the history of this provision of our Declaration of Rights,
relative to judicial independency. Let us now attentively consider

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