606 THE CHANCELLOR'S CASE.

It seems, that the formation of the government of our country,
like that of England, has not been so much the result of profound
political research as of happy coincidences: if much is to be attri-
buted to patriotism, to virtue, and to wisdom, still more must be
conceded to fortune, and a favourable concurrence of circumstances.
The English American colonists claimed the benefit of the whole
of the English code of laws; and especially those parts intended
for the preservation of the rights and liberties of the citizen; and
they adopted, in substance, the English system of government. In
this general translation and adoption, some parts of the code were
improved, others neglected; and portions of the system of govern-
ment were better here; others not so good as in England. The
representation of the people, in the popular branch of the colonial
legislatures, was every where more equal and better than that of

in the new constitution providing "a mode in which future amendments shall be
made therein," upon which John Randolph, among other things, said:

" I do not know a greater calamity that can happen to any nation, than having the
foundations of its government unsettled. It would seem as if we were endeavouring
to corrupt the people at the fountain head. Sir, the great opprobrium of popular
government, is its instability. It was this which made the people of our Anglo-
Saxon stock cling with such pertinacity to an independent judiciary, as the only
means they could find to resist this vice of popular government. By such a provision
as this, we are now inviting, and in a manner prompting the people, to be dissatisfied
with their government. Sir, there is no need of this. Dissatisfaction will come
soon enough. I foretell, and with a confidence surpassed by none I ever felt on any
occasion, that those who have been most anxious to destroy the constitution of Vir-
ginia, and to substitute in its pace this thing, will not be more dissatisfied now with
the result of our labours, than this new constitution will very shortly be opposed by
all the people of the State. Sir, I see no wisdom in making this provision for future
changes. You must give governments time to operate on the people, and give the
people time to become gradually assimilated to their institutions. Almost any thing
is better than this state of perpetual uncertainty. A people may have the best form
of government that the wit of man ever devised; and yet, from its uncertainty alone,
may, in effect, live under the worst government in the world. I will do nothing to
provide for change. I will not agree to any rule of future apportionment, or to any
provision for future changes called amendments to the constitution. They who love
change—who delight in public confusion—who wish to feed the cauldron and make
it bubble—may vote if they please for future changes. But by what spell—by what
formula are you going to bind the people to all future time ? Quis custodiet custodes ?
The days of Lycurgus are gone by, when he could swear the people not to alter the
Constitution until he should return ammo non, revertendi. I have no favour for this
Constitution. I shall vote against its adoption, and I shall advise all the people of
nay district to set their faces—aye—and their shoulders against it. But if we are to
have it—let us not have it with its death warrant in its very face: with the facies
hypoctratico—the sardonic grin of death upon its countenance."

The question on the proposition to insert a clause providing for future amend-
ments was then immediately taken and decided in the negative, ayes, twenty-five t
noes, sixty-eight.--(Debates Virg. Con. of 1829, page 789.)