60 . STRIKE'S CASE.

which he never did charge Rogers; that after he had obtained
possession of the lots, he leased one of them for a term of years;
and the tenants, not Rogers, erected on it a furnace which is of no
use to him, Strike, and which the tenants have a right to remove;
that after he purchased, Rogers never received the rents, nor paid
the ground rents and taxes with his, Strikers, consent; that he
never promised Rogers to reconvey the property to him on his
repaying the purchase money; that he paid the whole purchase
money to Rogers, and never paid any part of it to Jacob Small;
that Rogers continued to occupy one of the lots after the execution
of the deeds; and on his failing to pay the rent, he, Strike,
distrained his property for the rent in arrear, and thus obtained
payment; and finally, that he was appointed trustee under the
insolvent laws for Rogers; but never, as such, received any of his
property.

Upon this answer the defendant, Strike, rested his defence; he
never asked or obtained leave to put in any other answer; nor did
he in fact ever put upon file any paper purporting to be a further
answer to this bill.

On the 30th of March, 1818, the defendant, John Rogers, filed
his answer, in which he states, that he entered into a partnership
with Robert Henderson about the year 1807 or 1808, which con-
tinued until the year 1811, when they failed; that he owes the
plaintiffs, after deducting a small payment made to them, nearly
six thousand dollars; that a few days after the failure of the firm
of Henderson & Rogers, he executed the deeds exhibited as parts
of the bill, to Strike, in order to secure the property therein men-
tioned for the benefit of the creditors of Henderson & Rogers, and
of his own creditors, so as to save it from those who were the cre-
ditors of Henderson before the partnership, and also in trust to
preserve the surplus for himself and family; that this was the
understanding and agreement between him and Strike, who did
not pay, or agree to pay any part of the money which was the
nominal consideration of those deeds; that those deeds were
entirely voluntary, and were not intended to operate as a sale, or
to become such in any event, but were merely to remain as a trust;
for the property thus conveyed was worth at that time, much more
than the consideration money expressed in the deeds, and he had
been offered four thousand dollars for it by these plaintiffs; that at
the time he executed those deeds, neither he, nor the firm of Hen-
derson & Rogers, owed any thing to Strike, nor were those convey-